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Abstract
Military service reduces the civilian work experience of veterans but subsidizes
their college attendance through the GI Bill. Estimates of veteran e¤ects using
the Vietnam-era draft-lottery show a post-service earnings impact close to zero in
2000, coupled with a marked increase in college attendance.. Viewed through the
lens of a Mincer wage equation, these results are explained by a attening of the
experience prole in middle age and a modest return to GI Bill schooling. Consistent
with Roy-type selection into college for veterans, IV estimates of the returns to GI
Bill-funded schooling are well below OLS estimates. These results are unchanged
in more general models that allow for nonlinear returns to schooling and possible
e¤ects of military service on health.
This study was conducted while the authors were Special Sworn Status researchers of the U.S. Census
Bureau at the Boston Research Data Center. Research results and conclusions expressed are those of the
authors and do not necessarily reect the views of the Census Bureau. This paper has been screened to
insure that no condential data are revealed. Special thanks got to B.K. Atrostic, Jim Davis, and Brian
Holly for help with the data used in this study. Thanks also go to Brigham Frandsen, Bruno Ferman,
and Simone Schaner for outstanding research assistance and to John Abowd, Daron Acemoglu, David
Autor, Gordon Dahl, Mark Duggan, Amy Finkelstein, Gary Solon, Jerry Hausman, David Lee, Mark
Killingsworth, Whitney Newey, Jesse Rothstein, Sarah Turner, Steve Pischke, and seminar participants
at the Summer 2007 NBER Labor Studies Meeting, Northwestern, the University of Michigan, Michigan
State, Rutgers, Princeton, the Spring 2008 SOLE meeting, the University of Chicago Graduate School of
Business, and the University of Rome for helpful discussions and comments. We gratefully acknowledge
funding from the National Science Foundation.
1 Introduction
Economists have long argued that compulsory military service amounts to a hidden tax
on soldiers. American conscripts were paid poorly while in the military and lost valuable
labor market experience relative to their civilian counterparts (Oi, 1967). On the other
hand, some social scientists see military service as a possible leg up, even for draftees,
primarily because of the generous GI Bill benets available to veterans. Its hard to
exaggerate the role played by the GI Bill in contemporary social history (see, e.g., Humes,
2006). Consistent with this positive view, World War II (WWII) veterans typically earn
somewhat more than same-age non-veterans, though white Vietnam era veterans, who
had access to a similarly generous wartime GI Bill, do a little worse.1
The investigation in this paper begins with new estimates of the long-term causal
e¤ects of Vietnam-era service. As in Angrist (1989, 1990), the problem of selection bias
is solved by using the Vietnam-era draft lotteries to construct instrumental variables (IV)
estimates. However, this paper goes beyond earlier work using the draft lottery in a
number of ways. First, because of newly available data from the 2000 Census, we are
able to look at the consequences of Vietnam-era conscription as the draft-lottery cohorts
approach age 50.2 Second, our inquiry is guided by a simple Mincer-style human capital
earnings function. This framework highlights two of the most important channels whereby
military service might a¤ect earnings, loss of experience and subsidized higher education,
and leads naturally to an empirical strategy where the returns to veteran-induced changes
in experience and schooling can be estimated jointly. Post-service schooling is especially
interesting in this context because Vietnam veterans had access to GI Bill benets similar
to those o¤ered to veterans of WWII and Korea.
Our empirical framework builds on a long tradition of research on the e¤ects of military
service on veteransschooling and earnings. The rst attempt to estimate the economic
returns to veterans post-service schooling is Griliches and Mason (1972), who report
results for a sample of WWII veterans from the 1964 CPS. The idea that time spent on
active duty military service should be seen as lost civilian labor market experience is also
discussed by Griliches and Mason (1972) and appears to originate with Mason (1970).
Schwartz (1986) similarly estimated the returns to schooling for Vietnam and Korean-
1See, for example, studies of veteran e¤ects cited in Angrist and Krueger (1994).
2We used condential birthday information in the 2000 le through an agreement with the Census
Bureaus Center for Economic Studies.
era veterans, arguing that the GI Bill probably lower returns. More recently, Angrist
(1993) estimated the impact of GI Bill subsidies on schooling and the economic return to
schooling for Vietnam veterans, while Lemieux and Card (2001) study Canadian veterans
of WWII. The Lemieux and Card (2001) paper reports IV estimates (using instruments
derived from cohort-province di¤erences in enlistment rates) as well as OLS estimates.
As far as we know, however, ours is the rst attempt to use a human capital framework
to provide a complete account of the causal e¤ects of veteran status on earnings.
Our investigation generates a number of clear ndings. First, the estimated e¤ects of
Vietnam-era service on earnings (and the estimated e¤ects on other labor market variables
such as employment) are nearly zero. This is roughly consistent with the experience
proles from Social Security data estimated by Angrist (1990). Second, the 2000 Census
data show a marked impact of Vietnam-era conscription on schooling, with e¤ects of a
magnitude similar to those reported in studies of the WWII and Korean-era GI Bills
by Bound and Turner (2002) and Stanley (2003). Finally, we put these pieces together
by simultaneously instrumenting schooling and experience in a human-capital earnings
function. The estimated returns to schooling that come out of this analysis are on the
order of 7 percent, markedly smaller than the corresponding OLS estimates. Although
this nding suggests some upward ability bias in OLS estimates, it is also consistent with
Roy-type selection into college where the returns to college attendance are compared with
college costs.
2 Empirical framework
A Mincer-style human capital earnings function highlights important channels through
which military service might a¤ect civilian earnings. Let yi denote the log weekly wage
of individual i in the draft lottery cohorts, si his years of schooling, and xi his potential
work experience. The Mincer equation is
yi = 0 + 1xi + 2x
2
i + si + ui; (1)
where ui is a residual that captures random variation in the earnings function across
individuals. Although stylized, equation (1) is a workhorse of empirical labor economics
that has repeatedly been found to describe essential features of the relationship between
schooling, experience, and earnings. As a robustness check, we also report results for
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somewhat more general models, where the returns to schooling are nonlinear and the
experience prole includes higher order terms.3
To model veteran e¤ects in the Mincer framework, we write years of schooling (si) and
potential work experience (xi) as:
si = s0i + vi; (2)
xi = ai   si   6  `vi = x0i   ( + `)vi; (3)
where vi is veteran status, ai is age, s0i denotes is schooling if he doesnt serve and
x0i  ai   s0i   6 is potential experience in the absence of service. We expect ` to be
about two years for Vietnam-era draftees. Volunteers usually served longer, but most of
the men who were compelled to serve by the draft lottery did so as conscripts.
The e¤ect of veteran status on schooling, , can be positive or negative. On one hand,
veterans were eligible for education subsidies through the GI Bill. On the other, veterans
cannot usually attend school at traditional college-going ages. College attendance at
older ages may be more costly, a result of higher foregone earnings or liquidity constraints,
especially for veterans with families. The e¤ect of compulsory military service on potential
experience, however, is almost certainly negative. For conscripts, military experience is
likely to be a poor substitute for the experience that these soldiers would have obtained,
had they not been forced to serve. We therefore see military service as delaying entry
into the civilian labor market. Specically, veterans are assumed to lose ` years of
civilian experience relative to men the same age and with the same educational attainment.
Taking account of the e¤ect of military service on schooling, Vietnam veterans lose (+`)
years of experience relative to non-veterans.
The Mincer equation leads to a model with a veteran e¤ect that interacts with x0i,
the level of potential work experience in the absence of military service. We focus initially
on a scenario where military service a¤ects earnings solely through lost experience; that
is,  = 0, si = s0i, and xi = x0i   vi`: Using these assumptions and re-arranging equation
(1), gives:
yi = 0 + 1x0i + 2x
2
0i + s0i + xivi + ui;
3A number of studies evaluate the functional form assumptions of the simple Mincer equation. Two
landmark contributions are Murphy and Welch (1990), which focuses on the shape of the experience
prole, and Heckman, Lochner, and Todd (2005), which explores the robustness of schooling returns in
the Mincer model. Although this work shows the traditional Mincer equation can be improved upon,
the strong assumptions of the traditional Mincer model appear to matter little for our purposes. This is
probably because our sample is limited to middle-aged men and because the changes in experience and
schooling induced by military services are small enough for linearity to be a reasonable approximation.
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where xi  0 + 1x0i and
0   [1`  2`2]; (4a)
1   22`: (4b)
Fitting a similar model to log social security earnings proles for 1978-1984 (ignoring any
causal e¤ects of military service on education), Angrist (1990) estimated `=2.08 (s.e.=.38),
with an experience prole such that 0 =  :225, and 1 = :011: In other words, veterans
start out at a -.225 wage disadvantage, but the gap closes by .011 each year. In this
specication, the veteran earnings gap is zero when the mean of xi  20:5 or agei  39
for high school graduates.4
The e¤ect of military service on schooling, summarized by the parameter , has down-
stream consequence for earnings via the returns to schooling, si, and the experience
terms, 1xi and 2x
2
i : When  is nonzero, the parameters determining the net veteran
e¤ect become:
0 =  [1( + `)  2( + `)2] + ; (5a)
1 =  22( + `): (5b)
In this case, the veteran intercept, 0, also reects changes in labor market experience
due to schooling plus a term, , which captures the economic return to the service-
induced schooling increment. More generally, we can think of  and  as varying across
individuals, a point we return to, below. The veteran/experience interaction term, 1,
is also adjusted for experience lost while in school, but this adjustment should be small
since  turns out to be small relative to `. Thus, any additional schooling due to the
GI Bill should have a non-negligible impact on the level of veteran earnings with little
impact on the rate of veteran catch-up.
The pure loss-of-experience model generates a restriction linking 0 and 1. To see
this, note that the coe¢ cients 1 and 2 are separately identied as the coe¢ cients on ex-
perience and experience squared in (1), leaving only ` unknown in 0 and 1 (similarly, 0
and 1 are linked by equations 5a and 5b). A somewhat more general and econometrically
unrestricted model allows the linear potential experience term to vary with veteran status
according to 1i = 10 + 11vi, where 11 is most likely negative. This formulation can
4Imbens and van der Klaauw (1995) report an estimated earnings loss of about 5 percent for Dutch
conscripts ten years after their service. This is consistent with the earnings penalty that might be expected
from lost experience given the short period of service in Holland.
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be motivated by the Ben-Porath (1967) model of continuous human capital investment,
since military service shortens the horizon for returns to post-service on-the-job training.
In this specication, the human capital earnings function can be written:
yi = 0 + 10x0i + 2x
2
0i + s0i + xivi + ui;
where xi becomes xi  ~0 + ~1x0i, with
~0 =  [(10 + 11)( + `)  2( + `)2] + ; (6a)
~1 =  [22( + `)  11]: (6b)
This model is characterized by a reduced initial earnings loss, with a slower rate of catch-
up than in the simpler, constant-slope models. Fitting a version of the reduced-slope
model with no schooling e¤ects, Angrist (1990) estimated `=1.84 (s.e.=.43), ~0 =  :189,
and ~1 = :006. In this case, the veteran earnings gap disappears when the mean of
xi = :189=:006  31:5 or agei  50 for those with a high school diploma. Thus, allowance
for an additional free parameter generates earnings proles with somewhat slower veteran
catch-up.
The results reported below suggest that the extra schooling fueled by the GI Bill comes
out to about .3 years. Assuming, as earlier work and our results below suggest, that the
returns to this additional schooling are roughly .07, the GI Bill adds about 2 percent to
veteransearnings. The extra schooling also reduces experience, generating somewhat
more complicated terms involving ( + `). But in the 2000 census, the draft lottery
cohorts are of an age where experience proles are nearly at and well-approximated by
a linear prole. It therefore seems reasonable to think of reduced-form veteran e¤ects in
2000 data as estimates of
net =  10( + `) + ; (7)
obtained by setting 11 = 2 = 0. Since we estimate the linear prole to have a slope
equal to about .007, equation (7) with an assumed loss of experience of 2 years (the service
obligation of draftees) accounts for a net causal impact of veteran status on earnings close
to zero.
The Mincer equation is a highly stylized model with no direct e¤ect of military service
on earnings. In the empirical work, we also consider a version that allows for direct
e¤ects of military service on earnings through health. Still, the simple Mincer model
has important implications that can be checked empirically. A key implication of both
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the restricted and unrestricted loss-of-experience models is that by the time of the 2000
Census, when average age in the 1950-52 cohorts reached 48, the veteran earnings gap
should have closed. Moreover, if the GI Bill is important, we should look for a modest
return to schooling that partially or entirely o¤sets any residual earnings gap due to lost
experience.
Two nal econometric points are worth mentioning. First, the GI Bill, which we
see as the main force driving changes in schooling due to veteran status, a¤ects post-
secondary schooling but has little to do with either primary or secondary schooling (an
institutional fact that is reected in our estimates). We can therefore allow for some
degree of nonlinearity in the returns to schooling by treating years of primary and years of
secondary schooling as exogenous covariates, while treating years of college as endogenous
in a two-stage least squares (2SLS) procedure based on (1).
Second, our reduced-form estimates of the causal e¤ects of veteran status, i.e., causal
e¤ects estimated by instrumental variables without imposing the structure of the Mincer
equation, are local average treatment e¤ects (LATEs) for draft-lottery compliers in the
sense of Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin (1996). Compliers in this case are men who served
in the Vietnam era because they were assigned a low lottery number but would not have
served otherwise. We can link the compliers idea with the more structural interpretation
outlined in this section using random coe¢ cients notation. Specically, in this context
local average treatment e¤ects (LATE) can be seen as estimating
E[ 10i(i + `i) + iijv1i > v0i];
where v1i denotes is potential veteran status when draft-eligible, v0i denotes is potential
veteran status when ineligible (so compliers have v1i > v0i), and the i subscripts on 10i;
i, and i represent cross-sectional heterogeneity in the returns to experience, schooling,
and the e¤ects of military service on schooling. This link recognizes, for example, that
terms of service di¤ered for draftees and volunteers, and that other veteran groups might
be a¤ected di¤erently by the GI Bill. As it turns out, however, our estimates of the
e¤ects of the GI Bill are remarkably close to those reported by Bound and Turner (2002)
and Stanley (2003) for World War II and Korean-era veterans.
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3 Data and First-Stage
3.1 The 2000 Census 1-in-6 File
The 2000 Census long form sample includes approximately one-sixth of US households.5
For the purposes of this study, we created an extract of US-born men residing in the
50 States and the District of Columbia, born between 1948 and 1953 or in subsets of
these birth years. Because the cohorts of 19-year-olds at risk of conscription in the draft
lotteries were born from 1950-52, our analysis looks at the sample of men in this group.
This sample includes about 700,000 whites and 96,000 nonwhites. There was a smaller
but non-negligible draft-lottery impact on men born in 1948 and 1949, so estimates are
also reported for an expanded sample of men born 1948-52. The 1948-52 sample includes
more than 1.14 million whites and about 155,000 nonwhites. Finally, although no one
born after 1952 was drafted, men born in 1953 were assigned RSNs and a few volunteered
in anticipation of possible conscription. We therefore report rst-stage estimates for the
1953 cohort.
Roughly 24 percent of men born 1950 to 1952 served in the Vietnam era and about 38
percent were draft-eligible. These and other descriptive statistics appear in Table 1, which
reports means by veteran status and race for the 1950-52 sample (Descriptive statistics
for the 1948-52 sample and means by single year of birth appear in Appendix Tables
A1 and A2). Descriptive statistics for labor market variables are collected in Panel A.
Among whites, veterans have lower employment rates and earnings than non-veterans,
while the pattern is reversed for nonwhites. For example, the annual 1999 earnings of
white veterans was about $39,500, while white non-veterans earned $48,500 that year.
Unemployment rates are low in both the veteran and non-veteran groups, but many men,
especially nonwhites, were out of the labor force.
Overall, the average schooling level in the sample is 13.8 years for whites and 12.6 years
5The 1-in-6 long form sample is the basis for the publicly available PUMS les. These les, documented
in US Census Bureau (2005), are simple random samples drawn from the 1-in-6 le, though the 1-in-6
le is not a simple random sample from the census sampling frame. Rather, the Census Bureau reduces
the sampling rate in more densely populated areas. Adjustment for variation in sampling rates is made
here by using the weighting variables that are included in the long-form le. These weights adjust for
non-response as well as for non-random sampling, and are designed to match external population totals
by age, race, sex and Hispanic origin. In practice, weighting matters little for our results. We also
conrmed that the means from publicly available data from the 1-in-6 le are close to those from the 5
percent le distributed through IPUMS. The original 2000 long form sample includes Puerto Rico and
island territories; residents of these areas are omitted from our study.
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for nonwhites. The average years of college is 1.76 for whites and 1.05 for nonwhites.
These statistics can be seen in Panel B.6 The contrast in average educational attain-
ment by veteran status parallels the contrast in earnings, with white veterans obtaining
less schooling and non-white veterans obtaining more schooling than their non-veteran
counterparts. On the other hand, although white veterans are less likely than white
nonveterans to have attended or completed one or more years of college, they are more
likely than non-veterans to be high school graduates. Among nonwhites, veterans are
more likely than nonveterans to have attended college or graduated from high school.
However, nonwhite nonveterans are more likely than nonwhite veterans to have earned a
BA.
3.2 The Draft-Lottery First Stage
The rst draft lottery, held in December 1969, a¤ected men born in 1944-50 who were at
risk of conscription in 1970, while subsequent draft lotteries involved 19-year-olds only.
Men born in 1951 were at risk of conscription in 1971 and men born in 1952 were at risk
of conscription in 1972. Men born in 1953 were assigned lottery numbers in 1972, but
there were no draft calls in 1973. Although men as old as 26 could have been drafted as
a result of the 1970 lottery, the risk of conscription for all cohorts a¤ected by a lottery
was limited to the lottery year.
Each lottery was associated with a draft-eligibility ceiling or cut-o¤. Men with an
RSN below the ceiling were draft-eligible while men with an RSN above the ceiling were
draft-exempt. Draft-eligibility ceilings were 195 in the 1970 lottery, 125 in the 1971 lottery
and 95 in the 1972 lottery. Draft eligibility is highly correlated with Vietnam-era veteran
status, but the link is far from deterministic. Many men with draft lottery numbers
below the ceiling were able to avoid conscription through an occupational or educational
deferment, or because of poor health or low test scores, while many with lottery numbers
above the ceiling volunteered for service. Throughout the Vietnam era (1964-1975), most
soldiers were volunteers.
In the sample of men born 1950-52, the e¤ect of draft eligibility on Vietnam-era veteran
status is .145 for whites and .094 for nonwhites. These and other draft-eligibility e¤ects
are reported in the rst rows of Table 2 (Panel A for whites and Panel B for nonwhites).
6We imputed years of schooling with a modication of the the scheme in Jaeger (1997). See the
appendix for details. Years of college ranges from 0-4 and was constructed from imputed schooling as
Min(Max(Years of schooling -12,0), 4), as in Bound and Turner (2002).
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The table also shows draft-eligibility e¤ects for the pooled sample of men born 1948-52.
These e¤ects are somewhat smaller than in the younger subsample (.11 for whites and
.072 for nonwhites) because the draft-eligibility rst-stage is smaller for men born in 1948
and 1949 than for men born in 1950. This is not surprising since many of those who
served in the older cohorts had entered the military before the 1970 draft lottery. Table
2 also documents a small draft-eligibility rst stage for the 1953 cohort (about .031, with
1953 "draft-eligibility" coded using the 1972 lottery cuto¤ of 95). Because the e¤ect on
men born in 1953 is small, we omit this cohort from the main empirical analysis. Draft-
eligibility e¤ects for men born 1944-47 (not reported here) are smaller than those for men
born 1953 so we omit these cohorts as well.
The most important feature of the relationship between lottery numbers and military
service is the drop in the probability of service at the draft-eligibility cuto¤. This can
be seen in Figure 1, which plots estimates of the conditional probability of service given
lottery numbers for men born 1950-53. The gure shows probabilities smoothed across 5-
RSN cells by single year of birth, but the smoothing does not straddle the draft-eligibility
cuto¤ in each cohort.7 Like Table 2, the gure documents modest variation in the prob-
ability of service within draft-eligibility groups. Part of this variation is due to higher
voluntary enlistment rates among men with low lottery numbers men who volunteered
could expect more choice regarding terms of service (e.g., choice of branch of service),
while draftees mostly served in the Army. Another important feature of Figure 1 is the
muted relationship between veteran status and lottery numbers for nonwhites. Angrist
(1991) shows that this can be explained by the fact that nonwhites were more likely than
whites to consider military service an attractive career option.
3.2.1 Expanded Instrument Sets
Motivated by Figure 1, we constructed instruments from a set of ve lottery-group dum-
mies. These were chosen to match draft-eligibility cuto¤s for each cohort, with allowance
for additional draft-motivated enlistment as high as RSN 230. The 5z instrument set for
7Estimates were smoothed using lowess with a bandwidth of .4 and a standard tricube weighting
function.
9
individual i is fz1i; z2i; z3i; z4i; z5ig where
z1i = I[RSNi  95];
z2i = I[95 < RSNi  125];
z3i = I[125 < RSNi  160];
z4i = I[160 < RSNi  195];
z5i = I[195 < RSNi  230];
and I[] is the indicator function. This allows for kinks at each draft-eligibility cuto¤,
while breaking the set of lottery numbers up into roughly equal-sized groups between
RSN 95, the lowest cut-o¤, and RSN 230, beyond which the e¤ect of lottery numbers on
enlistment is negligible. Note that a draft-eligibility dummy (eligi) can be constructed
from the elements of 5z as follows
eligi = z1i + I[Y OBi  51](z2i) + I[Y OBi  50](z3i + z4i)
where Y OBi is is year of birth. This shows that eligi is a function of both lottery-number
main e¤ects and interactions with year of birth.
The rst two columns in Table 2 report estimates of the 5z rst stage in pooled
samples.8 Column 1 shows that men born 1950-52 with RSNs up to 95 were .16 more
likely to serve than men with RSNs above 230 (the reference group). The next group, with
RSN 96-125, was .091 more likely to serve than the reference group; the next group was
.059 more likely to serve; the next group after that was .04 more likely to serve; and the
last group with RSN 196-230 was .0065 more likely to serve. All of these rst-stage e¤ects
are precisely estimated and signicantly di¤erent from zero. As with the draft-eligibility
e¤ects, estimates of 5z e¤ects are consistently smaller for nonwhites than for whites. F -
statistics in the pooled 1950-52 and 1948-52 samples range from 134 for nonwhites to over
2400 for whites.
The 5z instrument set does not produce more precise 2SLS estimates than eligi alone.
This is in spite of the fact that partial F-statistics measuring the relative contribution
of 5z in a rst-stage that includes eligi are highly signicant (e.g., F = 91 for whites
in the 1950-52 sample). We therefore report estimates using an instrument set, labeled
5zx, that interacts 5z with year of birth. The 5zx set includes 15 instruments for the
8The estimates in Table 2 and the second-stage estimates that follow control for year of birth, state
of birth, and month of birth.
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1950-52 sample and 25 instruments for the 1948-52 sample. The 5zx rst stage appears
in columns 3-7 of Table 2. This rst stage documents a modest role for draft-motivated
enlistment. For example, even though the 1971 draft-eligibility cuto¤was 125, men born
in 1951 with lottery numbers between 126 and 160 were .05 more likely to serve than men
with lottery numbers above 230. Partial F -statistics for the marginal contribution of 5zx
in a model that includes 5z are on the order of 150 for whites and 10 for nonwhites.9
4 Labor-Market E¤ects
We look rst at employment and earnings. The results reported here are 2SLS estimates
of the parameter  in the equation
Yi = w
0
i + vi + "i; (8)
where Yi is an outcome variable; vi is veteran status; and wi is a vector of covariates that
includes year of birth dummies, state of birth dummies, and month of birth dummies.
Year of birth is a necessary control in models identied by the exclusion of draft-eligibility
since older men were more likely to be eligible. Month of birth adjusts for any bias arising
from the fact that the 1970 lottery, the only one to use physical randomization, resulted
in an RSN sequence correlated with month of birth (in practice this does not appear to
be important). State of birth is a natural pre-treatment control, inclusion of which might
increase the precision of second-stage estimates. As a benchmark, ordinary least squares
(OLS) estimates of equation (8) are also reported.10
As discussed in the previous section, 2SLS estimates of equations like (8) capture the
e¤ect of service on those who were drafted or who volunteered in the face of draft risk,
in other words, draft-lottery compliers. The average causal e¤ect for compliers is the
local average treatment e¤ect (LATE) generated by draft-lottery instruments (Imbens
and Angrist, 1994). The assumptions required for a LATE interpretation of draft-lottery
9A larger instrument set with dummies for RSN 1-30 and RSN 31-60 adds little to the precision
obtained with 5zx: Likewise, a non-parametric rst stage using the tted values from Figure 1 fails to
generate a meaningful gain in precision relative to 5zx.
10A potential problem with the second-stage estimates is the possibility of selection bias due to excess
mortality among draft-eligible men. There are two likely channels for this. The rst is war-related
deaths, since civilian samples are limited to those who survived the war. The second is elevated post-
service mortality due to physical injury, PTSD, or other long-term consequences of military service such
as an increased likelihood of cigarette smoking (as suggested by Bedard and Deschenes, 2006, for WWII
veterans). For reasons discussed in the appendix, however, mortality-related selection is unlikely to be
important for the draft-lottery cohorts.
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estimates are (a) that draft lottery numbers are independent of potential outcomes in
the treated and non-treated state and (b) monotonicity of the rst-stage relation (here,
monotonicity means draft-eligibility can only make military service more likely for any
given individual, as seems plausible).
The independence assumption is supported in part by random assignment. Lottery
numbers should be uncorrelated with ability or family background. Part of this as-
sumption is also an exclusion restriction which states that the only channel by which
draft lottery numbers a¤ected outcomes is military service. E¤ects of military service
on schooling do not necessarily signal a violation of the exclusion restriction if any extra
schooling caused by draft-eligibility is itself a consequence of military service (e.g., via
the GI Bill). But we might worry that schooling e¤ects reect draft-avoidance behavior
(via student deferments) and not military service per se. We argue below, however, that
student deferments were probably of little importance for the draft-lottery cohorts.
Its also worth noting that most soldiers who served in the lottery period were not
compliers; rather, they were true volunteers who were not drafted and did not volun-
teer simply to avoid conscription.11 Estimates using draft-lottery instruments need not
generalize to the population of true volunteers. Nevertheless, the e¤ects of military ser-
vice on men compelled to serve against their will reect the historical consequences of
conscription. These estimates may also be relevant for contemporary discussions of mili-
tary manpower policy, since compliers in the future are likely to be similar to those from
the draft-lottery period.12 Moreover, given an economic mechanism such as the Mincer
equation of Section 2, which explains the e¤ects of Vietnam-era service, we might draw
broader conclusions as to how conscription a¤ects soldiers. Not surprisingly, however,
these conclusions require stronger assumptions than a reduced-form "treatment-e¤ects-
style" analysis of causal e¤ects.
11The proportion of veterans who were compliers can be calculated as follows: let v1i denote is veteran
status if i is draft eligible (eligi = 1) and v0i denote is veteran status if i is ineligible (eligi = 0). Random
assignment makes eligi independent of fv1i; v0ig. Veteran status is vi = v0i+eligi(v1i v0i) and compliers
have v1i   v0i = 1. Given monotonicity, v1i  v0i, so the proportion of draft-eligibility compliers is given
by the draft-eligibility rst stage, P [v1i   v0i = 1] = E[v1i   v0i] = E[vijeligi = 1]  E[vijeligi = 0]. The
proportion of veterans who are draft-eligibility compliers is E[v1i   v0ijvi = 1] = P [vi = 1jv1i   v0i =
1]P [v1i   v0i = 1]=P [vi = 1] = P [eligi = 1]P [v1i   v0i = 1]=P [vi = 1]. For white men born 1950-52, this
is :376(:145=:236) = :231.
12The Selective Service System web site states that "if a draft were held today," it would involve a
lottery over 19-year olds. There would be few deferments, as in the Vietnam-era lottery, with at most
a one-semester deferment for enrolled students. And it seems likely that any future draft would come
in wartime. Finally, as in the Vietnam era, those conscripted would be men who do not nd GI Bill
education benets enough of an inducement to volunteer. See http://www.sss.gov/viet.htm.
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Draft-lottery estimates constructed using the 2000 Census show little evidence of an
e¤ect of Vietnam-era conscription on the labor market outcomes of whites. This can be
seen in Panel A of Table 3, which reports estimates of e¤ects on labor market status
and earnings using di¤erent instrument sets. For example, 2SLS estimation using draft-
eligibility status as an instrument in the sample of white men born 1950-52 generates
e¤ects of -.0043 (s.e.=.0072) on employment and -517 (s.e.=1240) on earnings. The corre-
sponding estimates in the sample of white men born 1948-52 are -.0047 (s.e.=.0072) and
-115 (s.e.=1243). Estimates of e¤ects on log weekly wages, computed for the sample of
men with positive earnings, are similarly small. In contrast, the OLS estimates in columns
2 and 6 show that veteran status is associated with worse labor market outcomes and lower
employment rates. The OLS estimates, about -7,900 to -8,600 for annual earnings and
-11 percent to -12 percent of weekly wages, are outside the 2SLS condence intervals.
The pattern of OLS estimates is reversed for nonwhites, with veterans more likely to
be working and earning more than non-veterans. But the 2SLS estimates in Panel B of
Table 3 o¤er little evidence of an impact on the employment or earnings of nonwhites: the
estimated earnings e¤ects for nonwhites are positive but insignicant. It should be noted,
however, that the 2SLS estimates for nonwhites are considerably less precise than those
for whites, due both to a smaller sample and a weaker rst-stage. Using draft eligibility
as an instrument, the estimated e¤ect of Vietnam-era service on the log weekly wages of
nonwhites born 1950-52 is -.037 with a standard error of .067. Some of the estimated
e¤ects on weeks and hours worked by nonwhites are positive and signicantly di¤erent
from zero, e.g., an increase of 3.7 hours per week in column 7 (s.e.=1.7). There is also some
evidence of reduced unemployment for nonwhites in the 1948-52 sample. On the other
hand, the estimated e¤ects on employment and weeks worked by nonwhites are positive
but insignicant. On balance, therefore, the results for nonwhites seem inconclusive,
though perhaps leaning towards positive long-run e¤ects.
Its noteworthy that the 5zx instrument set (5 lottery-number dummies with a full
set of year-of-birth interactions) produces only slightly more precise estimates than eligi
alone. The clearest precision gains appear in the 1948-52 sample. For example, the
standard error for the e¤ect on earnings in the sample of whites born 1948-52 falls from
1243 to 1133, with similar coe¢ cient estimates. The standard error for the e¤ect on log
wages changes by only .01 in this sample, from .16 to .15. This reects the fact that
although the 5zx interactions terms are highly signicant in the rst stage, they are not
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very big.
As a partial check on the underlying identifying assumptions, we computed over-
identication test statistics for the key earnings and wage results in Table 3, and for the
key schooling results in Table 4 (years of schooling and years of college), discussed below.
For whites, all eight test statistics come out with p-values of at least .4. A couple of the
p-values for nonwhites are between 1-5 percent, but there are no decisive rejections. In
the LATE framework, the over-identication test is as much an exploration of treatment
e¤ect heterogeneity from one instrument set to another as a test of instrument validity.
These test results therefore suggest that the treatment e¤ects identied by changes in
draft-eligibility are (statistically) indistinguishable from treatment e¤ects identied by
changes in draft-motivated enlistment on either side of the eligibility cuto¤. Conditional
on a constant causal e¤ect, we can also take high over-identication p-values as empirical
support for the underlying exclusion restrictions that motivate draft-lottery instruments.
The 2SLS estimates in Table 3 contrast with the earnings losses reported for white
veterans in Angrist (1990). The latter range from 10-15 percent of FICA-taxable earnings
in 1981-84. As suggested by the framework outlined in Section 2, however, results from
the 2000 Census can be reconciled with the earlier results if the costs of conscription are
due primarily to lost labor market experience. By 2000, the draft lottery cohorts had
reached middle age, when experience proles are fairly at, so the veteran penalty should
have faded.
5 E¤ects on Schooling
Compulsory military service appears to have increased the educational attainment of
Vietnam-era veterans, a result documented in Table 4. For example, the 2SLS estimates
using eligi in the 1950-52 sample suggest that white veterans got .345 more years of
schooling than nonveterans. The corresponding results are slightly lower in the 1948-52
sample, but change little when estimated with an expanded instrument set. Both samples
generate precise estimates with standard errors of about .05. In contrast to the results
for whites, however, the estimates for nonwhites (reported in Panel B) are smaller and
not signicantly di¤erent from zero.
The remainder of Table 4 shows that the increase in years of schooling for white veter-
ans results primarily from more years of college, with precisely estimated e¤ects ranging
from .24-.27. More specically, veterans were more likely to attend college (including
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partial years) or to earn an associates degree. These e¤ects are on the order of .06-.09.
The increase in the likelihood of completing a BA degree is smaller though still marked,
at around .05. Perhaps surprisingly, there is also a small e¤ect on high school completion
(roughly 2 percentage points) and a very small e¤ect on upper secondary grade comple-
tion. These e¤ects may be due to GEDs obtained by veterans without a high school
diploma. In addition, since the 1990s, many states have o¤ered Vietnam-era veterans
honorary high school diplomas solely on the basis of their military service.13
5.1 GI Bill Benets vs. Draft Deferments
The schooling shifts documented in Table 4 are most likely a consequence of the Vietnam-
era GI Bill, which o¤ered stipends similar in generosity to those available to veterans of
WWII and Korea.14 Vietnam veterans were especially likely to have used the GI Bill for
education and training. Data from the 2001 Survey of Veterans (SOV) show that among
whites, 44 and 42 percent of WWII and Korean-era veterans used benets for education
and training, while the usage rate was 50 percent for Vietnam-era veterans. Vietnam-era
veterans were also more likely than earlier cohorts to have used their benets for college
course work: 63 percent of Vietnam-era GI Bill beneciaries used benets for college
courses, while the corresponding gures for WWII and Korean-era benet users are 53
and 56 percent.15
The notion that the GI Bill increased schooling is supported by a number of earlier
studies. For example, Bound and Turners (2002) preferred IV estimates of the e¤ects
of WWII service on college completion by white men are around 5-6 percentage points
while their preferred estimates of e¤ects on years of college range from .23-.28. Stanleys
(2003) estimates of the e¤ects of the Korean-era GI Bill eligibility on college completion
13Angrist and Krueger (1992) found a mostly insignicant relation between lottery numbers and educa-
tion using data from the 1979-85 CPSs. But these results are too imprecise to detect e¤ects on schooling
of the size reported here. Moreover, some of the Vietnam veteran schooling advantage seems to have
accumulated after Angrist and Kruegers (1992) sample period.
14The WWII GI Bill included a $500 tuition benet and a monthly stipend. In the 1970s, the Vietnam-
era GI Bill paid full-time students a stipend almost identical in value to the WWII package (adjusting
for ination) and more generous than the Korean-era full-time stipend. These benet levels were almost
double the average cost of tuition, room, and board at 4-year public universities in this period. The real
value of the Vietnam-era GI Bill declined in the 1980s, but remained above the cost of tuition, room, and
board (Data from authorstabulations and Bound and Turner, 2002).
15The pattern for nonwhite veterans is similar, though the levels are lower. GI Bill statistics in this
paragraph are from the authorstabulation of responses to the 2001 SOV. For purposes of this comparison,
samples of veterans were limited to the principle birth cohorts who served in each era (years of birth with
at least 100 observations in the SOV).
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are also on the order of 5-6 percentage points while his estimates of e¤ects on years of
college range from .20-.33. The college completion e¤ects reported in Table 4 are a little
over 5 points for whites and range from .24-.27 for years of college, remarkably similar
to the Bound and Turner (2002) and Stanley estimates. The estimates in Table 4 also
echo Turner and Bound (2003) in that they show larger e¤ects of the GI Bill on whites
than nonwhites. Finally, Lemieux and Card (2001) report e¤ects of a similar magnitude
in cohorts that benetted from the Canadian GI Bill, while Angrist (1993) nds large
post-service schooling increases associated with the use of the Vietnam-era GI Bill.16
The leading alternative explanation for schooling e¤ects estimated using draft-lottery
instruments is draft-avoidance through education-related draft deferments. In the 1960s,
college students could delay and eventually escape conscription by staying in school. Men
with low draft lottery numbers may therefore have been more likely to stay in college or
to enroll in college, hoping to avoid service through an educational deferment. Weighing
against this possibility is the fact that the importance of educational deferments declined
sharply during the draft-lottery period. President Nixon announced a college-deferment
phase-out in April 1970. In 1971 new deferments ended, and existing deferments were
extended only one term or to graduation for seniors. The declining importance of college
deferments is reected in the cohort- and sex- specic enrollment rates analyzed by Card
and Lemieux (2001). Their analysis shows no deviation from trend in the male-to-female
college graduate ratio or the proportion with some college in cohorts born 1950 or later.17
5.2 Additional Evidence on the GI Bill Hypothesis
Estimates of schooling e¤ects by single year of birth, reported in Table 5, also weigh
against draft deferment as the primary force behind the schooling e¤ects in Table 4. In
particular, Table 5 shows that in spite of the decreasing availability of college deferments
from 1970 onwards, the estimated e¤ects on years of schooling and years of college are
16The BEOG program (Pell grants) also played an important role in expanding college attendance for
adult students in the 1970s (see, e.g., Seftor and Turner 2002), but Vietnam veterans were not especially
likely to have received Pell grants. Among male Vietnam veterans aged 35-39 in the SOV of 1987 (roughly
the cohorts of the 2000 Census), 54 percent had used the GI Bill, while only 7.4 percent reported having
received any federal (non-Veteran) aid, and only 2.3 percent received federal grants (including Pell grants).
The overlap with Pell grants is small because Pell was means-tested while the GI Bill was not and because
half of the GI Bill benet amount was counted as income when determining Pell grant eligibility (U.S.
Congressional Budget O¢ ce 1978, p.24).
17For institutional background related to draft deferments, see the chronology in Selective Service
System O¢ ce of Public A¤airs (1986) and Semiannual Reports of the Director of the Selective Service
System from the early 1970s.
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substantial for white men born in 1951 and 1952. The largest e¤ects of military service
on these two schooling variables are for men in the 1951 cohort, few of whom would have
been deferred for long. Estimates of e¤ects on years of schooling and years of college for
the 1952 cohort (which had no access to college deferments) are smaller than for the 1951
cohort, but similar in magnitude or larger than the estimated e¤ects on white men born
from 1948-50.
Di¤erences across cohorts in the 2SLS estimates of e¤ects on some-college dummies
mirror the di¤erences in estimates of e¤ects on years of schooling and years of college.
For example, the estimated e¤ect on a dummy variable indicating one or more years of
college falls from .105 for the 1951 cohort to .068 for the 1952 cohort. On the other hand,
the BA e¤ect is larger for the 1952 cohort than for the 1950 cohort, in spite of the latters
wider access to college deferments. Its also worth noting that the estimates by single
year of birth for nonwhites, though imprecise, are typically larger for younger cohorts. On
balance, therefore, Table 5 points away from draft deferment as the primary explanation
for the results in Table 4.
VeteransSchooling in the CPS
A second piece of evidence supporting the GI Bill explanation of increased schooling
among Vietnam veterans comes from the schooling trends of veterans as observed in
the Current Population Surveys (CPS). Our interpretation of these trends is based on a
model that divides total educational attainment into three parts: pre-service schooling for
veterans or schooling completed as of the typical entry age for non-veterans ( sAi ); schooling
acquired between the typical entry and discharge ages (sBi ); and the di¤erence between
completed schooling and the schooling completed at the typical discharge age (sCi ).












i as schooling at ages 22-24, and si as
schooling completed by age 40, when GI Bill eligibility expired for the cohorts studied
here.
In principle, military service can have a causal e¤ect on either sBi and s
C
i or both.
In contrast, sAi is a "pre-treatment" variable that might be correlated with veteran status
but should not be caused by veteran status. To make this explicit, let sBi (v) denote
the potential schooling acquired during the service period, where v = 0; 1 indexes veteran
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status. Similarly, let sCi (v) denote the potential schooling acquired in the post-service
period. Veteran and non-veteran potential schooling increments are dened for all i,
regardless of realized veteran status.
To highlight key features of the causal connection between military service and school-
ing, we make the not unrealistic assumption that soldiers get no schooling while in the




We also assume that non-veterans complete their education by the time most veterans




These two assumptions can be linked to the potential outcomes notation in Section 2 by












Observed schooling is therefore
si = s0i + (s1i   s0i)vi = sAi +sBi (0) + [sCi (1) sBi (0)]vi:
Thus, the causal e¤ect of veteran status on an individual veterans schooling is [sCi (1) 
sBi (0)]: In other words, the causal e¤ect of military service on individual schooling is
the veteran post-service schooling increment, sCi (1), net of the schooling gains foregone
while in the military, sBi (0):
In practice, individual causal e¤ects are not observable so we try to estimate average
e¤ects. The average causal e¤ect of military service on veteransschooling is
E[sCi (1) sBi (0)jvi = 1] = E[sCi (1)jvi = 1]  E[sBi (0)jvi = 1]: (10)
Military service increases average education when the average post-discharge increase in
veteransschooling is enough to overcome the education veterans lost while serving. The
18
quantity E[sCi (1)jvi = 1] has a sample counterpart (assuming we can get the timing
right). But the quantity E[sBi (0)jvi = 1] is counterfactual: we have to make some
assumptions - other than those of the IV framework - to get an independent handle on it.
As a rst step towards the identication of E[sCi (1) sBi (0)jvi = 1], note that the
observed veteran/nonveteran di¤erence in expected schooling growth from entry age to
completion is
E[si   sAi jvi = 1]  E[si   sAi jvi = 0] = E[sCi (1)jvi = 1]  E[sBi (0)jvi = 0]: (11)
The sample analog of this expression contrasts veteran and non-veteran schooling growth.
This is not quite what we want since the observedE[sBi (0)jvi = 0] is subtracted instead of
the counterfactual E[sBi (0)jvi = 1]. But assuming E[sBi (0)jvi = 0] = E[sBi (0)jvi =
1], that is, the schooling veterans lost while in the military is equal to the schooling non-
veterans obtained at the same ages, equation (11) is the average causal e¤ect of veteran
status on schooling expressed in equation (10). In practice, the schooling non-veterans
obtained during the service period probably exceeded the schooling veterans lost while in
the military, so the empirical counterpart of (11) is, if anything, an underestimate of (10).
We estimated the di¤erence in schooling increments by veteran status using a sample of
white men in the 1964-1991 CPS. This covers the period from the beginning of the Vietnam
era to just beyond the expiration of Vietnam-era GI Bill entitlements in 1989. The
underlying conditional means can be seen at the top of Figure 2, which plots educational
attainment by age and veteran status for the Vietnam-era cohorts.18
Panel A of Figure 2 shows that the educational attainment of Vietnam veterans born
from 1948 to 1952 increased little when these men were in their early twenties, while the
schooling of non-veterans the same age was rising sharply. On the other hand, while the
age-schooling prole of non-veterans attened early, the schooling of Vietnam veterans
continued to increase when these men were in their thirties.
Panel B of Figure 2 focuses on the evolution of the di¤erence in average education
by veteran status at each age. For the purposes of this gure, di¤erences for single
years of age were smoothed using either a two-year or three-year moving average. This
18A drawback of the CPS for our purposes is that most active duty soldiers are not in the sampling
frame so we miss many veterans (the CPS includes only soldiers stationed in the US, living o¤-base or
with their families). The absence of most active-duty soldiers probably tends to bias the veteran average
upwards at young ages since some of those counted as veterans will have returned to school while active-
duty soldiers have not yet had the chance to do so. Hence, the baseline veteran decit is probably even
larger than shown in the gure. A detailed description of the data and methods used to construct Figures
2 appears in the appendix.
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panel documents the rapidly increasing and then shrinking veteran/non-veteran schooling
di¤erential. The change in the schooling di¤erential by veteran status is another version
of equation (11) since
E[si   sAi jvi = 1]  E[si   sAi jvi = 0] (12)
= fE[sijvi = 1]  E[sijvi = 0]g   fE[sAi jvi = 1]  E[sAi jvi = 0]g:
This expression highlights the di¤erences-in-di¤erences nature of the identication strat-
egy outlined in this section.
The empirical counterpart of the right-hand side of (12) appears at the bottom of
Figure 2. Specically, Panel C plots the veteran/nonveteran di¤erence in the moving
average of schooling, relative to the average over the rst two or three years of age in Panel
B. The corresponding di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates of the e¤ect of veteran status on
schooling range from 0 to .4 years depending on the moving average window and the width
of the age range used to estimate completed schooling (the older the group the larger the
e¤ect). For example, taking age 38 as the terminal point gives an increase of .2 years
using a two-year moving average and .4 years using a three-year moving average. Thus,
our analysis of CPS data on schooling trends comes down close to the 2SLS estimates of
the e¤ect of veteran status on schooling using draft lottery instruments.
6 Schooling, Experience and Earnings
Here, we bring the experience and schooling channels together using the framework out-
lined in Section 2. In this framework, veteran status a¤ects wages by reducing potential
experience xi and increasing schooling si, but with no direct e¤ects. For purposes of
estimation, the loss of experience associated with veteran status is xed at 2 years, as
estimated in Angrist (1990) and consistent with the terms of service for draftees. We start
with a human capital earnings function with three endogenous variables: xi, x2i and si.
Age and cohort e¤ects are assumed to be captured by the potential-experience quadratic
so that age or year of birth are available as instruments.
Estimates of equation (1) are reported in Table 6 for the sample of white men born
1948-52. The 1948-52 sample is more useful than the 1950-52 sample in this context
because the wider age range helps to pin down the experience prole. We focus on
whites because the estimated impact of military service on the schooling of nonwhites is
smaller and not signicantly di¤erent from zero. As a benchmark, column (1) reports
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OLS estimates treating all variables as exogenous. With potential experience dened as
in equation (3), the returns to schooling are about .12. The estimated experience prole
in this case does not have the usual concavity, reecting the fact that the prole in this
age range is fairly at (the experience derivative is small, about .009 (s.e.=.001)). The
veteran earnings loss due to lost experience, constructed from equations (4a) and (4b), is
equal to -.015 (s.e.=.0006).
Instrumental variables estimates of the return to schooling are considerably smaller
than the corresponding OLS estimates. This can be seen in columns 2-4 of Table 6, which
report 2SLS and limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) estimates of equation
(1). In over-identied models, LIML provides a check for possible nite-sample bias in
2SLS.19 As shown in column 2, estimates from a just-identied model using agei, age2i
and draft-eligibility (eligi) as instruments for the three endogenous variables xi, x2i and si
generate a return of .068 (s.e.= .034). Swapping year-of-birth dummies for agei and age2i
generates a 2SLS estimate of .075 (s.e.=.033), reported in column 3. The rst-stage F-
statistic for schooling, calculated in a manner that takes account of multiple endogenous
variables, has a value of 16. This is outside the range where bias in 2SLS estimates
is usually a concern.20 The LIML estimates in column 4 are close to the corresponding
2SLS estimates in column 3, not surprisingly since the degree of over-identication for
19The nite-sample behavior of LIML is discussed in, e.g., Anderson, Kunitomo, and Sawa (1982).
The standard errors reported for both the LIML and 2SLS estimates in Table 6 are heteroscedasticity-
consistent. LIML is motivated by a homoscedastic normal model but can be understood as a k-class
estimator in either case. In some cases, however, heteroscedasticity biases LIML; see, Hausman, et al.
(2007).
20The multivariate rst-stage F is constructed as follows. Assume covariates have been partialled out
of the instrument list and that there are two endogenous variables, W1 and W2 with coe¢ cients 1 and
2. We are interested in the bias of the 2SLS estimator of 2 when W1 is also treated as endogenous.
In matrix notation, the instrument vector is Z, with projection matrix Pz = Z(Z 0Z) 1Z 0. The second
stage equation is
y = PzW11 + PzW22 + [+ (W1   PzW1)1 + (W2   PzW2)2];
where  is the vector of structural errors. The 2SLS estimator of 2 can be seen to be the OLS regression
on Pz[M1zW2], where M1z = [I   PzW1(W 01PzW1) 1W 01Pz]. This is also 2SLS using Pz to instrument
M1zW2. In other words, the endogenous variable of interest is M1zW2, itself the residual from a 2SLS





The explained sum of squares (numerator of the F-statistic) that determines bias is therefore the expec-
tation of [W 02M1zPzM1zW2], as can be shown formally using the group-asymptotic sequence in Bekker
(1994) and Angrist and Krueger (1995).
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this model is only two.
In an attempt to increase the precision of the estimated schooling coe¢ cients, we
used the 5zx instrument set constructed from ve RSN dummies interacted with year of
birth. This generates somewhat smaller schooling coe¢ cients (not reported here). But
the multivariate F-statistic for for the schooling rst stage in this model is low, about
3.6, and the LIML estimates fall to zero with standard errors much larger than those for
the corresponding 2SLS estimates. Since the just-identied or moderately over-identied
estimates reported in columns 2-4 of Table 6 appear to be more reliable than the estimates
coming out of heavily over-identied models, we focus on the former.
The fact that the experience prole is close to linear with a modest slope is conrmed
in columns 5-8 of Table 6, which report the results of estimating models similar to those
reported in columns 1-4, but with a linear experience prole. The experience derivative
is given by the linear experience term in this case and equal to .009 for OLS and about
.007 for 2SLS and LIML. The schooling coe¢ cients estimated in models with a linear
experience prole are virtually identical to those reported in columns 1-4. As a further
check on the sensitivity of these estimates to the functional form of the experience prole,
Appendix Table A4 reports a set of estimates with cubic and quadratic experience controls.
Here too, the estimated returns to schooling are virtually unchanged.21
6.1 Disability E¤ects
The empirical framework motivating Table 6 allows for indirect e¤ects of veteran status
via schooling and experience. In practice, however, changes in veteranshealth provide
an additional avenue whereby military service may have a¤ected earnings. For example,
Hearst, Newman and Hulleys (1986) pioneering draft-lottery study found elevated civilian
mortality risk among draft-eligible men, mostly due to an excess of suicide and motor
vehicle accidents. On the other hand, we found no evidence that draft-eligible men are
disproportionately missing in the 2000 Census, as might be expected if Vietnam veterans
su¤ered excess mortality (see Section A of the Appendix for details). A number of recent
studies using the draft lottery also nd little evidence of adverse health consequences for
21Paralleling the original specications, the extra experience terms are treated as endogenous while
adding age3 and/or age4 to the instrument list. Because age, age2, age3, age4 are close to collinear in our
sample of men born 1948-52, we rescale age and experience into an interval from -1 to +1, a modication
that leaves the theoretical schooling parameter unchanged. Hausman and Newey (1995) use a similar
rescaling to overcome collinearity when working with a nonparametric series estimator.
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Vietnam-era draftees.22
Although empirical results to date have been mixed, the possibility that military
service a¤ected health is a clear concern in principle. Veterans may have been injured in
combat, either physically or as a result of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Veterans
also have health concerns related to the Agent Orange defoliant used by American forces.
Finally, the loss of earnings associated with Vietnam-era conscription may itself have been
debilitating. Consistent with this view, estimates in our working paper show an impact
of Vietnam-era veteran status on non-work-related disability rates for whites (Angrist and
Chen, 2007). At the same time, our 2SLS estimates generate no e¤ect on work-related
disability rates.23
To explore the impact of possible disability e¤ects on the Mincer equation, we esti-
mated a model that allows disability rates to increase with Vietnam-era service:
yi = 0 + 1xi + 2x
2
i + si + di + ui: (13)
In this equation, di indicates non-work-related disability status (the disability variable
that appears to have been most a¤ected by veteran status in our earlier paper), with
coe¢ cient . The addition of di to the list of endogenous variables generates highly
imprecise results, but we can get a sense of the consequences of higher disability rates for
2SLS estimates of equation (13) by inserting plausible values of  in the following model
yi  yi   di = 0 + 1xi + 2x2i + si + i: (14)
As a benchmark, we set  =  :2, slightly larger in magnitude than the OLS estimate of
the wage loss associated with non-work disabilities using equation (13).
22Goldberg, Richards, Anderson, and Rodin (1991) found no signicant increase in alcohol consumption
among draft-eligible men. Dobkin and Shabani (2006), using draft-lottery instruments, conclude that
there is no clear evidence for e¤ects of Vietnam-era service on a range of health outcomes. Hearst,
Buehler, Newman and Rutherford (1991), using draft-lottery instruments, found no increase in AIDS
among Vietnam-era veterans. Bedard and Deschenes (2006) suggest that WWII service increased smoking
and smoking-related disease, probably because WWII veterans were given free cigarettes. Eisenberg and
Rowe (2007), using draft-lottery instruments, nd increased smoking in the immediate post-Vietnam
period, but the e¤ects are imprecise and disappear in later data. They also nd no evidence of e¤ects on
other health outcomes.
23Given these inconsistencies, the estimated impact on disability rates for veterans may reect, at least
in part, the nancial incentives in the veteranscompensation system. Autor and Duggan (2007) note
that veterans disability compensation is not taxed to o¤set earnings. Duggan, Rosenheck and Singleton
(2006) show that enrollment in the veterans compensation program seems highly sensitive to changes
in program rules and to unemployment rates. A recent VA study investigates a surge in compensation
claims from 1999-2004 and the large variation in these claims across states (VA, 2005).
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Adjusting for disability status in this manner increases the 2SLS estimates of the
returns to schooling by .005-.007, as Panel B of Table 6 shows. Variations on these results
for alternative choices of  can be obtained by observing that b, the 2SLS estimate
of the schooling coe¢ cient in equation (14), is related to b0, the 2SLS estimate of the
schooling coe¢ cient imposing  = 0; as follows:
b = b0   b;
where b is the 2SLS estimate of the coe¢ cient on si in a regression of di on the right-
hand-side variables in equation (14), again, treating all variables as endogenous. Becauseb in this adjustment is only about .03, the di¤erence between b and b is small for any
plausible value of .
6.2 Nonlinearity and Heterogeneity in the Returns to Schooling
The 2SLS estimates in Table 6 reect both the range of variation induced by the draft
lottery and the fact that not everyone is a draft-lottery complier. Specically, because the
draft lottery a¤ects schooling through veteran status, which in turn works through the GI
Bill, the 2SLS estimates capture the return to a college-level schooling increment for GI
Bill users. With nonlinear and heterogeneous returns, this complicates the comparison
of 2SLS to OLS estimates or to IV estimates using other instruments. Although the 2SLS
and OLS estimates reported here were constructed using linear constant-e¤ects models,
both types of estimates can be understood as weighted average e¤ects. The weighting
schemes for the two estimation strategies di¤er and therefore the estimated returns may
di¤er due to nonlinearities in the causal relation between schooling and earnings, even if
there is no omitted variables bias in the OLS estimates.
This 2SLS weighting scheme is easiest to describe for IV estimates in a nonlinear
model without covariates. Let fi(s) denote the potential (or latent) earnings that person
i would receive after obtaining s years of education. Note that the function fi(s) has an
i subscript on it while s does not. This function tells us what i would earn for any
value of schooling, s, and not just for the realized value, si. In other words, fi(s) answers
causal what if questions for multinomial si: A linear random coe¢ cients model sets
fi(s) =  + is, but here we allow f
0
i(s) to vary with both s and i.
Suppose that si takes on values in the set f0; 1; :::; sg; so there are s incremental causal
e¤ects, fi(s)   fi(s   1), for s = 1; :::; s: The 2SLS estimator is a computational device
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that generates a weighted average of these incremental e¤ects, with a weighting function
we can estimate, so as to learn where the action is with a particular instrument. Draft
lottery instruments for schooling put the most weight on years of college.
To esh this out, assume that a draft-eligibility dummy is used to estimate the returns
to schooling in a model with no covariates, so 2SLS is a Wald estimator. Let s1i denote
the schooling that i would get if eligi = 1, and let s0i denote the schooling that i would
get if eligi = 0: The formula below, adapted from Angrist and Imbens (1995), shows how
the Wald estimator captures an average causal response:
E[yijeligi = 1]  E[yijeligi = 0]
E[sijeligi = 1]  E[sijeligi = 0] =
sX
s=1
!sE[fi(s)  fi(s  1)js1i  s > s0i] (15)
where
!s  P [s1i  s > s0i]Ps
j=1 P [s1i  j > s0i]
(16)
is a positive weighting function that sums to one. The assumptions that lay behind
this formula are: that draft-eligibility is randomly assigned and a¤ects earnings only
through schooling (the independence and exclusion restrictions), that draft-eligibility af-
fects schooling for at least some people (existence of a rst stage), and that schooling can
only increase as a consequence of draft-eligibility (monotonicity).24
Formula (15) says that the Wald estimator is a weighted average of E[fi(s)   fi(s  
1)js1i  s > s0i], the average di¤erence in potential earnings for compliers at point s. In
this case, compliers are men driven by draft eligibility from a level of schooling less than s
to at least s. By virtue of monotonicity, the size of the complier group, P [s1i  s > s0i],
is given by the di¤erence in the CDF of si conditional on eligi at point s.25 There is
another link of interest here: The 2SLS weighting function for a 2SLS model with yi on
the left-hand side and si endogenous is proportional to the reduced form for a 2SLS model
24Formally, these assumptions are (a) Independence and Exclusion:
ffi(0); fi(1); :::; fi(s); s0i; s1ig q eligi, (b) First-stage: E[s1i   s0i] 6= 0, and (c) Monotonicity:
s1i  s0i 8i (or vice versa). In this illustrative bivariate example, the exclusion restriction implies that
the experience prole is at and that there are no other veteran e¤ects.
25The CDF di¤erence is
P [s1i  j > s0i] = P [s0i < j]  P [s1i < j]
= P [si < jjeligi = 0]  P [si < jjeligi = 1]:
The denominator of the weighting function,
Ps
j=1 P [s1i  j > s0i], equals the Wald rst stage,
E[sijeligi = 1]   E[sijeligi = 0]; because the mean of a non-negative random variable is the sum-over-
support of one minus the CDF.
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with si on the left-hand side and vi endogenous. Thus, the 2SLS estimates of e¤ects of
veteran status on schooling reported in columns 3 and 7 of Table 4 give us a look at the
(unnormalized) weighting function, (i.e., the numerator of 16) since just-identied 2SLS
estimates are proportional to the corresponding reduced form.
The appropriately normalized 2SLS weighting function for white men born 1948-52 is
plotted with pointwise condence bands in Figure 3 (these estimates correspond to those
in column 7 of Table 4). The weighting function jumps at the level of some college, while
tapering o¤at the MA level and higher. The shaded bars show the histogram of schooling
for veterans, characterized by a distinctive mode for high school graduates. The 2SLS
estimates reported in Table 6 therefore tell us more about the returns to years of college
than a histogram weighting scheme would do.
The CDF di¤erence plotted in Figure 3 is relevant for 2SLS estimates even when
schooling is independent of potential outcomes. In particular, if si is independent of
potential outcomes, then E[fi(s)   fi(s   1)js1i  s > s0i] = E[yijsi = s]   E[yijsi =
s 1]; the di¤erence in the the conditional expectation function (CEF) of log wages given
schooling at si = s: In this case, the Wald estimator becomes
sX
s=1
!s(E[yijsi = s]  E[yijsi = s  1]);
where !s is the weighting function in (15) as before. This highlights the fact that 2SLS
captures an incremental return over the range of values shifted by the instrument, whether
or not selection bias is a problem.
An analogous interpretation of OLS estimates also comes from the conditional expec-
tation function. Specically, whether causal or not, OLS estimates produces a weighted-
over-s average of E[yijsi = s]. The formula below (adapted from Angrist and Krueger,






s(E[yijsi = s]  E[yijsi = s  1]) (17)
where




Thus, OLS estimates give more weight to incremental changes in the CEF at points in
the distribution of si closer to the median (where P [si  s](1  P [si  s]) is maximized)
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and at points where a break induces a larger shift in the conditional mean of schooling
(where (E[sijsi  s]  E[sijsi < s]) is maximized).26
Estimates of s are also plotted in Figure 3 (with dots). Like the 2SLS weighting
function, the OLS weighting function tops up for years of college. Overall, however, the
OLS weighting function is atter than the 2SLS weighting function. Therefore, motivated
by Figure 3, and as a specication check for the 2SLS estimates, we estimated a piecewise
linear model that allows di¤ering returns to years of college, years of secondary schooling,
and years of primary schooling.27 In practice, we dont have enough instruments to treat
each of the schooling components as endogenous. But because draft eligibility mostly
a¤ects years of college, it seems reasonable to treat the years of primary and years of
secondary schooling variables as exogenous controls, while instrumenting years of college
with draft-eligibility status. As before, the experience prole is treated as endogenous
and identied by age or year of birth.
The estimated returns to college are somewhat higher than the overall returns to
schooling in the piecewise linear model. This can be seen in Table 7, which reports results
from the piecewise linear model using a format similar to that of Table 6. Specically,
the OLS estimate in the rst row of column 1 increases to .13, while the corresponding
2SLS estimates range from .076 to .089 depending on the instrument list and whether the
experience prole is linear or quadratic. Adjustment for disability e¤ects increases the
2SLS estimates by a small amount as before, with returns as high as .097 in column 3.
Importantly, however, a substantial gap between the OLS and 2SLS estimates remains
even after focusing on the returns to a college-specic schooling increment.
Finally, a simple economic model with heterogeneous e¤ects can be used to see why
the returns to college attendance for GI Bill users might be below the average return for
all men who have attended college. Because the 2SLS estimand is shaped by nonlinearity
as well as by heterogeneity, its easiest to make this point when schooling as dichotomous,
so that nonlinearity is irrelevant. In particular, suppose that we are interested in the
returns to college education in a world where everyone either attends college (si = 1)
or nishes schooling with a high school diploma (si = 0). Since college attendance
is now the only margin on which draft-eligibility operates, equation (15) simplies to
26The OLS weights, s, are positive and sum to one, as can been by substituting si for yi in (17).
27The pieces were calculated as follows: years of primary = min(si; 8); years of secondary =
min[max(si  8; 0); 4]; years of college = min[max(si  12; 0); 4]. These pieces sum to min(si; 16), i.e., to
years of schooling capped at 16.
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E[fi(1)   fi(0)js1i = 1; s0i = 0], the average college premium for those who go to college
when draft-eligible but not otherwise.
We can dig further into the nature of heterogeneous returns using a Roy-type model
where the GI Bill a¤ects schooling by reducing costs by an amount  and men go to
college if the benets exceed the costs.28 Specically, suppose that costs are ci = c0 vi,
where c0 is the cost of attendance for non-veterans. The veteran status rst stage is:
vi = 0 + 1eligi + i;
where 1 is the e¤ect of draft-eligibility on veteran status and i is the rst-stage residual.
The schooling rst stage can be derived from this by writing:
ci = c0   [0 + 1eligi + i] = c0i   eligi;
where c0i  c0   [0 + i] and   1:
Potential schooling in this model is determined by a comparison of costs and benets
for men with draft-eligibility equal to zero and one:
s0i = 1[fi(1)  fi(0) > c0i]
s1i = 1[fi(1)  fi(0) > c0i   ]:
The return to lottery-induced college enrollment is therefore the local average treatment
e¤ect on draft-eligibility compliers:
LATEelig = E[fi(1)  fi(0)js1i = 1; s0i = 0]
= E[fi(1)  fi(0)jc0i  fi(1)  fi(0) > c0i   ]:
The return to college for the college educated, E[fi(1) fi(0)jsi = 1], is a weighted average
of LATEelig and the e¤ect of college attendance on men who go to college regardless of
their draft-eligibility status. In the language of Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin (1996), these
men are always-takers. The return to college attendance for always takers is
E[fi(1)  fi(0)js0i = s1i = 1] = E[fi(1)  fi(0)js0i = 1]
= E[fi(1)  fi(0)jfi(1)  fi(0) > c0i];
28The use of the Roy model to interpret IV estimates of heterogeneous returns to schooling originates
with Bjorklund and Mo¢ tt (1987). For a recent discussion using a 0-1 example as we do here, see
Heckman, Lochner, and Todd (2005).
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since, by virtue of monotonicity, s0i = 1 implies s1i = 1. The return to college for the
college educated can therefore be written as:
E[fi(1)  fi(0)jsi = 1] = E[fi(1)  fi(0)jfi(1)  fi(0) > c0i]pa + LATEelig(1  pa);
where pa  Prffi(1)   fi(0) > c0ijsi = 1g is the portion of always-takers among those
who enroll in college. In this example, the e¤ect on always-takers exceeds the e¤ect on
draft-eligibility compliers because
E[fi(1)  fi(0)jfi(1)  fi(0) > c0i] > E[fi(1)  fi(0)jc0i  fi(1)  fi(0) > c0i   ]:
Thus, Roy-type selection provides an economic explanation for low IV estimates of the
returns to schooling using draft-lottery instruments.29
7 Summary and Conclusions
Consistent with a attening of age-earnings proles in middle age, the adverse economic
consequences of Vietnam-era military service appear to have faded. At the same time,
data from the 2000 Census show a strong positive connection between schooling and mil-
itary service. This schooling gain is very likely due to the Vietnam-era GI Bill. Overall,
the schooling e¤ects estimated here are similar to those reported in earlier evaluations of
the impact of the WWII and Korean-era GI Bills by Bound and Turner (2002) and Stan-
ley (2003). In this case, however, we have the advantage of quasi-experimental random
assignment via the draft lottery and evidence from the equally generous but less-studied
Vietnam-era GI Bill. Interestingly, the results reported here are also broadly consis-
tent with Frederiksen and Schraders (1951) pioneering investigation of the impact of the
WWII GI Bill in the immediate post-war period. This study surveyed enrolled veterans
in an attempt to determine how many would not have gone to college but for the GI Bill.
The GI Bill was found to be important but not revolutionary: while many veterans cited
the GI Bill as key to their decision to attend college, 60 percent reported they denitely
would have gone to college without GI Bill funding.
An important contribution of our study is to use variation in Vietnam veteransexpe-
rience and schooling to identify the components of a traditional human capital earnings
function. Seen through the lens of a Mincer-style wage equation, the near-zero veteran
29Delayed college attendance followed by a shorter working life for veterans should act to increase
returns, but discounting should make this second-order relative to the direct e¤ects of GI Bill subsidies.
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wage penalty can be explained by the combination of lost experience on a at portion
of the experience prole and the economic return to additional schooling funded by the
GI Bill. IV estimates from a variety of specications point to an annualized return to
schooling on the order of .07, with somewhat larger estimates coming out of models that
allow for possible disability e¤ects and nonlinearities in the earnings function. Although
not precise enough to be statistically signicantly di¤erent from the OLS estimates (as
is common for IV estimates), the IV estimates are consistently below the corresponding
OLS estimates in all specications. As conjectured by Berger and Hirsch (1983), a simple
economic explanation for low returns to schooling among veterans is the large subsidy to
schooling provided by the GI Bill.
A low economic return to GI-Bill-subsidized schooling is not a universal nding. For
example, using the Canadian WWII-era GI Bill as a source of exogenous variation,
Lemieux and Card (2001) report IV estimates larger than the corresponding OLS es-
timates. But attenuated returns to post-service schooling are broadly in line with a
number of earlier investigations of the returns to schooling for Vietnam veterans. For
example, Schwartz (1986) estimated the returns to schooling to be .025 lower for Vietnam
veterans than for comparably-aged non-veterans, while Angrist (1993) reported a return
to Vietnam veteranspost-service schooling of .043 using the 1987 survey of veterans.
Another useful benchmark comes from Heckman, Lochner, and Todd (2005), who esti-
mate the impact of tuition and taxes on the internal rate of return to schooling under
alternative assumptions. They nd that tuition reduces the internal rate of return to
college completion for white men in the 1990 Census by about one quarter. Thus, the
GI Bill, which roughly covers tuition, room, and board at a state school, ought to reduce
equilibrium returns by at least as much.
A nal observation regarding the long-term consequences of Vietnam-era military ser-
vice seems in order. Although the earnings penalty for white Vietnam veterans has
largely disappeared, and these veterans come out ahead as far as schooling goes, the
lifetime earnings consequences of conscription for white Vietnam veterans have almost
surely been negative. To substantiate this claim, we added the (percentage) earnings loss
due to lost experience reported in Angrist (1990) to the earnings gain attributable to the
schooling di¤erential estimated here. We then applied returns and losses to the annual
earnings of high school graduates in the CPS and calculated the present discounted value
over the period 1972-2000. From the point of view of lottery-cohort soldiers discharged
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at age 21, the present value of lost earnings amounts to about 10 percent of earnings
through the year 2000, so that even after accounting for GI Bill benets, conscription
reduced veterans lifetime earnings. Although the GI Bill made this loss about 15 percent
smaller than it otherwise would have been, it did not come close to o¤setting the full costs
of conscription.
Appendix
A. Sample Selection Due to Mortality
Roughly 47,000 men died as a result of hostile action in the Vietnam Era (1964-75)
while 8.7 million personnel served in the military during this period. Overall casualty
rates among Vietnam-era veterans were low in part because less than half of active duty
personnel served in Indochina, and many served in positions not exposed to combat.
Although causality rates among draftees were higher than the overall death rate (because
most draftees served in the Army), draftees accounted for a minority of combat deaths.
Moreover, over 80 percent of combat deaths occurred before 1970.30 It therefore seems
unlikely that war-related deaths have a large e¤ect on the composition of the sample used
in our study.
An increase in civilian mortality for veterans seems more likely to a¤ect the composi-
tion of post-Vietnam samples than combat deaths, especially in view of Hearst, Newman
and Hulleys (1986) ndings of elevated civilian mortality for draft-eligible men. The ex-
cess deaths in the Hearst, Newman and Hulley study are due to suicide and motor vehicle
accidents, possibly related to PTSD.
As a simple check on the possibility of mortality-related selection bias, we compared
the actual and expected number of draft-eligible men in the 2000 Census by race and year
of birth. Following Hearst, Newman, and Hulley (1986), the expected ratio was computed
assuming birthdays (and hence lottery numbers) are uniformly distributed. Overall, draft-
eligible men are represented in the census sample almost exactly as predicted assuming
a uniform distribution of lottery numbers. Among whites, the predicted proportion eli-
gible is .40553, while the empirical proportion eligible is .40539. Among nonwhites, the
proportion eligible is more than predicted, .4085 versus .4038.
30Service and casualty statistics are from Table 583 in the 2000 Statistical Abstract, available on-line at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/statab/sec11.pdf. Data on casualties by year are available from
the national archives: http://www.archives.gov/research/vietnam-war/casualty-statistics.html#year.
Statistics on service in Indochina and exposure to combat are from Hearst, Newman and Hulley (1986).
Comparisons by single year of birth for white men born 1948-53, reported in detail in
Appendix Table A3, show draft-eligible men slightly over-represented in three cohorts and
slightly under-represented in 3 cohorts (one of these is the 1953 cohort, with no draftees).
Some of these di¤erences are signicant, but all are small. Three out of six cohort-specic
contrasts are signicant for nonwhites, but these always show slightly more eligibles than
predicted. Given the size and sign of these comparisons, it seems unlikely that excess
civilian mortality has a substantial e¤ect on the composition of the 2000 Census sample.
B. Construction of Figure 2
Figure 2 uses data from the 1964, 1965, and 1967-1991 CPS March Demographic Sup-
plements (the 1966 supplement does not contain veteran status). The raw data were
downloaded from the Minnesota Population Centers Integrated Public Use Microdata Se-
ries, accessible at www.ipums.org. We included white Vietnam veterans and non-veterans
born 1948-1952 in the sample. Year of birth was imputed assuming men were born af-
ter the survey date. Vietnam veterans are dened as men born between 1948-1952 who
were either veterans, as reported by the variable VETSTAT, or currently serving in the
military, as reported by the variable EMPSTAT. Use of VETSTAT instead of period-of-
service recodes adds a few veterans with post-Vietnam service, including some still in the
military.
Panel A of the gure shows mean years of education, derived from the variable HI-
GRADE, for veterans and non-veterans. Unlike CPS supplements from 1992 or later, the
pre-1992 supplements report years of education instead of highest degree obtained. Av-
erages were constructed by weighting microdata using the person level weight PERWT,
and collapsed over age rather than year, so at any given age, the average is derived from
multiple years of data. We selected the sample so that at least three birth cohorts (i.e., 3
years of data) contribute to any given age-education observation.
The series plotted in panels B and C were constructed by rst collapsing the education
data by age as for Panel A. We then constructed two- and three-year moving averages of
mean years of education. The moving averages are unweighted in that each age-education
cell enters with equal weight in the moving average. Panel B reports the di¤erence in
moving averages by veteran status. The X-axis reports the rst year of the age interval
included in each moving average observation. (For example, the age 20 three-year moving
average observation is the educational attainment of those aged 20, 21 and 22.) The same
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data were used to construct panel C, except that this panel shows the di¤erence between
the moving average at age 19 and subsequent values.
C. Schooling Imputation
Using a matched CPS le with responses to both old (highest grade completed) and new
(categorical) schooling questions, Jaeger (1997) calculates average and median highest
grade completed conditional on categorical school values. He nds that the conditional
median gives a better t than the mean. We therefore use median highest grade completed
for most categorical values. A drawback of this scheme, however, is that the categories in
the new CPS schooling variable di¤er slightly from those on the 2000 Census long-form.
Specically, the Census allows for an additional some-college category: "some college, but
less than one year." Because some veterans appear to have used the GI Bill to start
a college program which they then left, we would like to distinguish this group from
other veterans when imputing years of schooling. This may matter for our draft-lottery
estimates of linear-in-schooling human capital earnings functions. A second drawback of
the Jaeger scheme for our purposes is that it assigns the same value to those who report
nishing 12th grade with no diploma and those who received a diploma.
In view of these concerns, we used Jaegers ner conditional mean imputation to assign
values to the census categories "grade 12 no degree" and "one or more years of college".
Finally, we estimated a fractional year for the census category "some college but less
than one year", by assuming that time in college is exponentially distributed with a xed
dropout hazard each month. This hazard rate was estimated from the ratio of those with
at least 13 years completed to those with at least 13 years enrolled in the 1980 Census
(for men aged 26-36), assuming a xed hazard for 8 months of school. The exponential
parameter was then used to estimate expected months in school for those ever enrolled
in grade 13 college who drop out after one year. The result is an imputed value of 12.55
years. The resulting imputation scheme is: no schooling (0); nursery school through 4th
grade (2.5); 5th-6th grade (5.5); 7th-8th grade (7.5); 9th (9); 10th grade (10); 11th grade
(11); 12th grade no diploma (11.38); high school graduate (12); some college less than 1
year (12.55); 1 or more years of college no degree (13.35); associate degree (14); bachelors
degree (16); masters degree (18); professional degree (18); doctoral degree (18).
Its worth noting that a direct application of Jaegers formula generates results almost
identical to those reported in the paper. Note also that estimates of e¤ects of military
33
service on discrete schooling variables (e.g., an indicator for college graduation status) are
una¤ected by the choice of imputation scheme.
34
References
Anderson, T., N. Kunitomo, and T. Sawa (1982), Evaluation of the Distribution
Function of Limited Information Maximum Likelihood Estimator,Econometrica 59(4),
1009-1027.
Angrist, J. (1989), Using the Draft Lottery to Measure the E¤ects of Military Ser-
vice on Civilian Earnings, in Research in Labor Economics, vol. 10, edited by Ronald
Ehrenberg, Greenwich, CT: JAI.
Angrist, J. (1990), Lifetime Earnings and the Vietnam Era Draft Lottery: Evidence
from Social Security Administrative Records.American Economic Review 80(3), 313-36.
Angrist, J. (1991), The Draft Lottery and Voluntary Enlistment in the Vietnam Era.
Journal of the American Statistical Association 86(415), 584-595.
Angrist, J. (1993), The E¤ect of Veterans Benets on Education and Earnings,
Industrial and Labor Relations Review 46(4), 637-652.
Angrist, J. and S. Chen (2007), "Long-term Consequences of Vietnam-Era Conscrip-
tion: Schooling, Experience, and Earnings," NBER Working Paper 13411, September.
Angrist, J. and G. Imbens (1995), "Two-Stage least Squares Estimation of Average
Causal Response in Models with Variable Treatment Intensity," Journal of the American
Statistical Association 90(430), 431-442.
Angrist, J., G. Imbens and D. Rubin (1996), Identication of Causal E¤ects Using
Instrumental Variables, Journal of the American Statistical Association 91(434), 444-
455.
Angrist, J. and A. Krueger (1992), Estimating the Payo¤ to Schooling Using the
Vietnam-Era Draft Lottery, National Bureau of Economic Research, Working paper
4067.
Angrist, J. and A. Krueger (1994), Why Do World War II Veterans Earn More than
Non-veterans?Journal of Labor Economics 12(1), 74-97.
Angrist, J. and A. Krueger (1995), Split-Sample Instrumental Variables Estimates of
the Return to Schooling,Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 13(2), 225-235.
Angrist, J. and A. Krueger (1999), "Empirical Strategies in Labor Economics," Chap-
ter 23 in O. Ashenfelter and D. Card, eds., The Handbook of Labor Economics, Volume
3, Amsterdam: Elsevier Science B.V.
Autor, D. and M. Duggan (2003), The Rise in the Disability Rolls and the Decline
in Unemployment,Quarter Journal of Economics 118(1), 157-206.
Autor, D. and M. Duggan (2007), Distinguishing Income from Substitution E¤ects
in Disability Insurance,American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 97(2).
Bedard, K. and O. Deschenes (2006), The Impact of Military Service on Long-Term
Health: Evidence from World War II and Korean War Veterans,American Economic
Review 96(1), 176-194.
Bekker, Paul (1994), Alternative Approximations to the Distribution of Instrumental
Variable Estimators,Econometrica 62(3), 657-682.
Berger, M. and B. Hirsch (1983), The Civilian Earnings Experience of Vietnam-Era
Veterans,Journal of Human Resources 18(4), 455-79.
Ben-Porath, Yoram (1967), "The Production of Human Capital and the Life Cycle of
Earnings," Journal of Political Economy 75, 352-365.
Bound, J. and S. Turner (2002), Going to War and Going to College: Did World War
II and the G.I. Bill Increase Educational Attainment for Returning Veterans?Journal
of Labor Economics 20(4), pp. 784-815.
Bjorklund, A. and R. Mo¢ tt (1987), "The Estimation of Wage Gains and Welfare
Gains in Self-Selection," The Review of Economics and Statistics 69, 42-49.
Card, D. and T. Lemieux (2001), Going to College to Avoid the Draft: The Unin-
tended Legacy of the Vietnam War,The American Economic Review 91(2), 97-102.
Dobkin, C. and R. Shabani (2006), The Long Term Health E¤ects of Military Service:
Evidence from the National Health Interview Survey and the Vietnam Era Draft Lottery,
University of California at SantaCruz, Department of Economics, mimeo.
Duggan, M., R. Rosenheck and P. Singleton (2006), Federal Policy and the Rise in
Disability Enrollment: Evidence for the VAs Disability Compensation Program,Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research Working paper 12323.
Eisenberg, D. and B. Rowe (2007), E¤ects of Military Service in Vietnam on Smoking
Later in Life,Department of Health Management and Policy, University of Michigan,
mimeo.
Frederiksen, N., and W.B. Schrader (1951), Adjustment to College: A Study of 10,000
Veteran and Nonveteran Students in Sixteen American Colleges, Princeton, NJ: Educa-
tional Testing Service.
Goldberg, J., M. Richards, R. Anderson, and M. Rodin (1991), Alcohol Consump-
tion in Men Exposed to the Military Draft Lottery: A Natural Experiment,Journal of
Substance Abuse 3, 307-313.
Griliches, Z. and W.M. Mason (1972), Education, Income, and Ability,Journal of
Political Economy 80(3, Part II), S74-S103.
Hausman, J.A. and W. Newey (1995), "Nonparametric Estimates of Exact Consumers
Surplus and Deadweight Loss," Econometrica 63, 1445-1476.
Hausman, J.A., W. Newey, T. Woutersen (2007), John Chao and Norman Swanson,
Instrumental Variables Estimation with Heteroskedasticity and Many Instruments,The
Institute for Fiscal Studies, University College London, CEMMAP Working Paper No.
CWP22/07, September.
Hearst, N., J. Buehler, T. Newman, and G. Rutherford (1991), The Draft Lottery
and AIDS: Evidence Against Increased Intravenous Drug Use by Vietnam Veterans,
American Journal of Epidemiology 134(5), 522-525.
Hearst, N., T. Newman and S. Hulley (1986), Delayed E¤ects of the Military Draft
on Mortality: A Randomized Natural Experiment, mimeo, New England Journal of
Medicine 314(10), 620-24.
Heckman, J.J, L. Lochner, and P. Todd (2005), "Earnings Functions, Rates of Return
and Treatment E¤ects: The Mincer Equation and Beyond," IZA Discussion Paper No.
1700, August.
Humes, Edward (2006), Over Here: How the G.I. Bill Transformed the American
Dream, Harcourt, Inc., Orlando.
Imbens, G. and J. Angrist (1994), Identication and Estimation of Local Average
Treatment E¤ects,Econometrica 62(2), 467-475.
Imbens, G. and W. van der Klaauw (1995), Evaluating the Cost of Conscription in
the Netherlands,Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 13(2), 207-215.
Jaeger, D. (1997), Reconciling the Old and New Census Bureau Education Questions:
Recommendations for Researchers,Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 15(3),
300-309.
Lemieux, T. and D. Card (2001), Education, Earnings And The Canadian G.I. Bill,
Canadian Journal of Economics 34(2), 313-344.
Mason, William (1970), "On the Socioeconomic E¤ects of Military Service," Ph.D.
Dissertation, The University of Chicago.
Murphy, Kevin M. and Finis Welch (1990), "Empirical Age-Earnings Proles," Journal
of Labor Economics 8(2), 202-229.
Newey, W. (1990), E¢ cient Instrumental Variables Estimation of Nonlinear Models,
Econometrica 58(4), 809-837.
Oi, Walter (1967), The Economic Cost of the Draft,American Economic Review
57(2),39-62.
Schwartz, S. (1986), The Relative Earnings of Vietnam and Korean-Era Veterans,
Industrial and Labor Relations Review 39(4), 564-72.
Seftor, N. and S. Turner (2002), Back to School: Federal Student Aid Policy and
Adult College Enrollment,Journal of Human Resources 37(2), 336-352.
Selective Service System, O¢ ce of Public A¤airs (1986), A Short History of the Selec-
tive Service System, Washington: USGPO.
Stanley, M. (2003), College Education and the Midcentury GI Bills,Quarterly Jour-
nal of Economics 118(2), 671-708
Turner, S. and J. Bound (2003), Closing the Gap or Widening the Divide: the E¤ects
of the G.I. Bill and World War II on the Educational Outcomes of Black Americans,
Journal of Economic History 63(1), 145-177.
U.S. Bureau of the Census (2005), Technical Documentation: Census of the Popula-
tion, 2000: Public use Microdata Sample, Washington: US Bureau of the Census.
U.S. Congressional Budget O¢ ce (1978), the Congress of the United States Veterans
Educational Benets: Issues Concerning the GI Bill,October.
VA O¢ ce of Inspector General (2005), Review of State Variances in VA Disability
Compensation Payments,Department of Veterans A¤airs O¢ ce of Inspector General,
Report No. 05-00765-137 Washington, DC.
Veterans Benets Administration (2000), Annual Benets Report for Fiscal Year
1999,Washington, DC: Veterans Benets Administration.
Veterans Benets Administration (2002), Annual Benets Report for Fiscal Year

















































Figure 1: First Stage Plots - The relation between the probability of military service and draft lottery numbers. 
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Figure 2: Average schooling by age and veteran status (for white men born 1948-1952).  Notes: The figure 









































































Figure 3: 2SLS and OLS weighting functions, along with standard error bands for the 2SLS weights (for white 
men born 1948-52).  Notes: The plot also shows the schooling histogram for veterans (shaded bars).
Table 1: Descriptive statistics, by race and veteran status, for men born 1950-52
Whites Nonwhites
All Vietnam veteran Non-veteran All Vietnam veteran Non-veteran
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Draft eligibility (by RSN) .376 .532 .327 .382 .482 .350
Veteran status (served in Vietnam Era) .236 1 0 .244 1 0
Post-Vietnam service .038 .064 .030 .068 .078 .065
Age 48.2 48.4 48.2 48.2 48.3 48.2
A. Labor market variables 
Employment .861 .844 .866 .665 .702 .654
Unemployment .027 .030 .026 .056 .053 .057
Not in labor force .112 .126 .108 .279 .245 .290
Usual hours worked 41.5 40.7 41.7 32.8 34.3 32.3
Weeks worked 44.8 44.1 45.0 35.9 37.5 35.4
Wage and salary income 46406 39472 48553 27584 28505 27287
Log weekly earnings (positive values) 6.75 6.65 6.78 6.41 6.43 6.41
Self employment income (positive values) 5261 3123 5923 1709 1230 1863
B. Education variables
Imputed highest grade completed 13.8 13.4 13.9 12.6 13.0 12.4
Years of college (0-4) 1.76 1.36 1.88 1.05 1.14 1.01
9th grade + .977 .988 .974 .948 .981 .938
10th grade + .965 .978 .961 .923 .970 .908
11th grade + .948 .962 .943 .882 .950 .860
12th grade (no diploma) + .931 .949 .926 .832 .923 .802
High school graduate + .910 .927 .904 .770 .881 .735
Some college (less than 1 year) + .655 .616 .667 .468 .585 .431
1 or more years of college (no degree) + .582 .519 .601 .400 .486 .372
.411 .313 .441 .226 .243 .221
Bachelor's degree + .333 .204 .373 .160 .136 .168
Master's degree + .135 .071 .155 .057 .042 .062
Professional degree + .051 .017 .061 .018 .0094 .021
N 696530 166652 529878 96217 23246 72971
Note: The table shows statistics from the 2000 Census, 1:6 file, weighted by census sampling weights.
Associate's degree +
Table 2: First-stage estimates, by race and year of birth
Pooled cohorts By single year of birth
1950-52 1948-52 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A. Whites
Draft-eligibility effect .145 .112 .058 .074 .133 .138 .168 .031
(.0013) (.0010) (.0010) (.0025) (.0024) (.0023) (.0022) (.0024)
RSN effects (5z):
RSN 1-95 .160 .128 .065 .088 .154 .155 .173 .032
(.0015) (.0013) (.0031) (.0031) (.0029) (.0026) (.0026) (.0022)
RSN 96-125 .091 .082 .060 .077 .131 .128 .023 .0002
(.0023) (.0019) (.0047) (.0046) (.0044) (.0040) (.0034) (.0031)
RSN 126-160 .059 .058 .054 .061 .126 .050 .0084 .00002
(.0020) (.0017) (.0045) (.0043) (.0041) (.0036) (.0031) (.0029)
RSN 161-195 .040 .044 .044 .054 .102 .024 -.0013 .0017
(.0020) (.0017) (.0044) (.0043) (.0041) (.0034) (.0030) (.0029)
RSN 196-230 .0065 .0059 .0043 .0062 .013 -.0012 .0077 .0008
(.0019) (.0017) (.0043) (.0042) (.0038) (.0032) (.0031) (.0029)
F-statistics 2403 2294 111 202 731 861 1028 50.3
B. Nonwhites
Draft-eligibility effect .094 .072 .031 .049 .090 .096 .096 .027
(.0034) (.0028) (.0069) (.0065) (.0059) (.0060) (.0063) (.0058)
RSN effects (5z):
RSN 1-95 .100 .081 .039 .059 .101 .101 .099 .029
(.0041) (.0034) (.0086) (.0081) (.0074) (.0072) (.0070) (.0064)
RSN 96-125 .062 .058 .027 .072 .089 .090 .016 .0043
(.0061) (.0050) (.013) (.012) (.011) (.011) (.0095) (.0093)
RSN 126-160 .044 .041 .027 .042 .093 .034 .0052 .0018
(.0057) (.0047) (.012) (.012) (.011) (.010) (.0092) (.0086)
RSN 161-195 .022 .021 .012 .027 .066 -.0047 .0055 .0023
(.0055) (.0046) (.012) (.011) (.010) .0092 (.0092) (.0087)
RSN 196-230 -.0031 .0007 -.004 .018 .008 -.010 -.0055 .0021
(.0054) (.0046) (.012) (.011) (.010) .0093 (.0088) (.0090)
F-statistics 138 134 4.98 14.3 48.9 55.1 47.3 4.51
Note: The table reports draft-eligibility effects and RSN group effects estimated in separate regressions. Robust 
standard errors are shown in parentheses.  All models include a full set of dummies for year of birth, state of birth, 
and month of birth. Sampling weights were used for all estimates and statistics. (Year of birth dummies are dropped 
from the models used to produce columns 3-8).
Table 3: Effects of veteran status on labor market variables
1950-52 1948-52
2SLS 2SLS
Mean OLS 5zx Mean OLS 5zx
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A. Whites
Work variables in 1999
Employment .861 -.020 -.0043 -.0026 .855 -.010 -.0047 -.0033
(.0012) (.0072) (.0070) (.0009) (.0072) (.0066)
Unemployment .027 .0043 .0028 .0017 .027 .0028 .0022 .0014
(.0005) (.0033) (.0032) (.0004) (.0033) (.0030)
Not in labor force .112 .016 .0014 .0009 .118 .0074 .0025 .0019
(.0011) (.0066) (.0064) (.0008) (.0066) (.0060)
Usual hours worked 41.5 -.888 -.101 -.230 41.2 -.544 .055 -.137
(.054) (.334) (.325) (.040) (.335) (.305)
Weeks worked 44.8 -.752 -.133 -.192 44.5 -.243 -.120 -.175
(.054) (.330) (.321) (.040) (.331) (.301)
Earnings variables in 1999
Wage and salary income 46406 -8616 -517 -873 46595 -7936 -115 -548
(161) (1240) (1209) (128) (1243) (1133)
Log weekly wage 6.75 -.121 -.0038 -.0094 6.75 -.110 .009 -.0030
(.0026) (.016) (.016) (.0019) (.016) (.015)
Self employment income 5261 -2772 855 867 5285 -2846 487 668
(77.8) (616) (606) (62.3) (616) (567)
B. Nonwhites
Work variables in 1999
Employment .665 .049 .018 .033 .662 .063 .0013 .020
(.0040) (.040) (.039) (.0030) (.040) (.037)
Unemployment .056 -.0035 -.047 -.048 .054 -.0063 -.027 -.036
(.0019) (.019) (.019) (.0014) (.019) (.018)
Not in labor force .279 -.045 .029 .015 .284 -.057 .026 .016
(.0039) (.039) (.038) (.0029) (.039) (.035)
Usual hours worked 32.8 1.97 3.58 4.12 32.6 2.33 3.68 3.76
(.171) (1.71) (1.68) (.129) (1.73) (1.57)
Weeks worked 35.9 2.14 2.84 3.15 35.7 2.73 2.41 2.71
(.186) (1.86) (1.82) (.141) (1.88) (1.70)
Earnings variables in 1999
Wage and salary income 27584 1324 3476 4969 27711 2109 1006 3314
(313) (3231) (3199) (239) (3255) (2968)
Log weekly wage 6.41 .028 -.037 .012 6.43 .042 -.0090 .019
(.0074) (.067) (.065) (.0057) (.067) (.060)
Self employment income 1709 -616 328 436 1708 -511 1750 1115
(108) (1177) (1147) (82.4) (1167) (1077)
elig elig
Note:  All models include a full set of dummies for state of birth,  year of birth and month of birth. Columns 3-4 and 7-8 
report 2SLS estimates with the instrument sets listed. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Estimates were 
computed using sampling weights.
Table 4: Effects on education, by race and year of birth
1950-52 1948-52
2SLS 2SLS
Mean OLS 5zx Mean OLS 5zx
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A. Whites
Years of schooling (imputed) 13.8 -.549 .345 .348 13.8 -.547 .303 .324
(.0075) (.054) (.052) (.0057) (.053) (.049)
Years of college 1.76 -.511 .273 .269 1.79 -.532 .244 .254
(.0051) (.035) (.034) (.0038) (.034) (.031)
9th grade + .977 .015 .0056 .0061 .975 .020 .0021 .0040
(.0004) (.0031) (.0030) (.0003) (.0031) (.0028)
10th grade + .965 .018 .0080 .0083 .963 .025 .0042 .0062
(.0005) (.0037) (.0036) (.0004) (.0038) (.0034)
11th grade + .948 .021 .012 .013 .946 .029 .0071 .010
(.0007) (.0045) (.0044) (.0005) (.0045) (.0041)
12th grade (no diploma) + .931 .024 .015 .016 .930 .033 .009 .013
(.0008) (.0051) (.0049) (.0006) (.0050) (.0046)
High school graduate or higher + .910 .025 .023 .023 .908 .034 .017 .020
(.0009) (.0057) (.0056) (.0006) (.0057) (.0052)
Some college (less than 1 year) + .655 -.050 .079 .079 .659 -.048 .064 .070
(.0015) (.009) (.0093) (.0011) (.0094) (.0086)
1 or more years of college (no degree) + .582 -.082 .090 .089 .588 -.083 .074 .080
(.0016) (.010) (.010) (.0012) (.010) (.0090)
.411 -.126 .081 .079 .419 -.133 .074 .076
(.0015) (.010) (.010) (.0011) (.010) (.0091)
Bachelor's degree + .333 -.168 .053 .051 .341 -.176 .051 .051
(.0014) (.010) (.0094) (.0010) (.010) (.0088)
Master's degree + .135 -.082 .016 .017 .140 -.090 .019 .018
(.0009) (.0070) (.0068) (.0007) (.0070) (.0064)
Professional degree+ .051 -.043 .0047 .0037 .052 -.046 .010 .0057




Table 4 (cont.): Effects on education, by race and by year of birth
1950-52 1948-52
2SLS 2SLS
Mean OLS 5zx Mean OLS 5zx
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
B. Nonwhites
Years of schooling (imputed) 12.6 .542 .239 .224 12.5 .680 .208 .223
(.020) (.232) (.227) (.016) (.236) (.213)
Years of college 1.05 .133 .192 .172 1.05 .168 .146 .155
(.0117) (.119) (.116) (.0089) (.120) (.109)
9th grade + .948 .043 .0013 .0003 .944 .055 -.009 -.0018
(.0016) (.019) (.019) (.0013) (.020) (.018)
10th grade + .923 .063 -.0056 -.0044 .918 .079 -.015 -.0050
(.0019) (.023) (.022) (.0015) (.023) (.021)
11th grade + .882 .090 .019 .019 .876 .110 .016 .025
(.0023) (.027) (.027) (.0018) (.028) (.025)
12th grade (no diploma) + .832 .122 -.0021 -.0027 .826 .144 -.014 .0039
(.0027) (.032) (.031) (.0021) (.032) (.029)
High school graduate or higher + .770 .147 .055 .055 .766 .170 .045 .058
(.0032) (.035) (.034) (.0024) (.035) (.032)
Some college (less than 1 year) + .468 .158 .080 .083 .468 .171 .094 .092
(.0042) (.041) (.040) (.0031) (.041) (.037)
1 or more years of college (no degree) + .400 .117 .070 .068 .400 .132 .054 .065
(.0042) (.040) (.040) (.0032) (.041) (.037)
.226 .024 .055 .051 .228 .031 .042 .051
(.0036) (.035) (.034) (.0027) (.035) (.032)
Bachelor's degree + .160 -.032 .028 .019 .163 -.026 .012 .010
(.0030) (.031) (.030) (.0023) (.031) (.028)
Master's degree + .057 -.020 .0080 .0067 .060 -.021 .020 .011
(.0018) (.019) (.019) (.0014) (.020) (.018)
Professional degree+ .018 -.012 -.0028 -.0026 .019 -.012 .0086 .0018
(.0010) (.011) (.011) (.0008) (.011) (.010)
elig elig
Associate's degree +
Note:  All models include a full set of dummies for state of birth,  year of birth and month of birth. Columns 3-4 and 7-8 report 2SLS 
estimates with the instrument sets listed. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Estimates were computed using sampling 
weights.
Table 5: 2SLS Estimates of effects on schooling, by race and single year of birth
1948 1949 1950 1951 1952
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Whites
Years of schooling (imputed) .179 .122 .254 .460 .321
(.232) (.173) (.099) (.093) (.085)
Years of college .045 .188 .232 .357 .218
(.146) (.111) (.063) (.061) (.054)
1 or more years of college (no degree) + .005 .019 .088 .105 .068
(.041) (.031) (.018) (.017) (.016)
.004 .080 .072 .102 .067
(.042) (.032) (.018) (.018) (.016)
Bachelor's degree + .015 .061 .038 .075 .044
(.041) (.031) (.018) (.017) (.015)
Master's degree + .030 .021 -.004 .029 .024
(.031) (.023) (.013) (.012) (.011)
B. Nonwhites
Years of schooling (imputed) 1.002 -.226 -.014 .358 .135
(1.144) (.714) (.400) (.385) (.418)
Years of college .009 -.056 .057 .067 .275
(.589) (.355) (.205) (.200) (.209)
1 or more years of college (no degree) + .015 .040 .003 .052 .122
(.198) (.119) (.069) (.068) (.072)
.018 .031 -.004 .050 .066
(.172) (.104) (.060) (.058) (.061)
Bachelor's degree + -.073 -.087 .021 -.0220 .0330
(.152) (.091) (.052) (.051) (.054)
Master's degree + .112 .022 .023 -.029 .027
(.107) (.060) (.034) (.032) (.032)
Associate's degree +
Associate's degree +
Note:  The table reports 2SLS estimates of schooling effects by single year of birth using the 5z 
instrument set. All regressions include a full set of dummies for state of birth and month of birth. Robust 
standard errors appear in parentheses. Estimates were computed using sampling weights.
Table 6: Estimates of the returns to schooling for white men born 1948-52
Quadratic experience effect Linear experience effect
OLS OLS2SLS 2SLS LIML 2SLS 2SLS LIML
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
 A.  No disability adjustment
Years of schooling .117 .068 .075 .072 .117 .068 .074 .071
(.0006) (.0338) (.033) (.036) (.0006) (.0339) (.033) (.036)
Experience -.061 -.005 -.0169 -.0165 .009 .007 .0066 .0067
(.0048) (.0308) (.040) (.040) (.0006) (.0019) (.002) (.002)
.0012 .0002 .0004 .0004
(.0001) (.0005) (.0007) (.0007)
Experience derivative .0087 .0069 .0066 .0068
(.0011) (.0037) (.0018) (.0040)
-.015 -.013 -.013 -.013 -.018 -.014 -.013 -.013
(.0006) (.0019) (.0038) (.0020) (.0011) (.0037) (.0037) (.0039)
B. With disability adjustment
Education .116 .074 .082 .079 .116 .075 .080 .077
(.0006) (.0336) (.033) (.036) (.0006) (.0337) (.033) (.036)
-.016 -.014 -.013 -.013 -.018 -.014 -.014 -.014
(.0006) (.0037) (.0018) (.0040) (.0011) (.0037) (.0036) (.0039)
First-stage F-statistic for education 25.81 15.86 38.64 15.93
(adjusted multivariate)
Elig+age Elig+yob Elig+age Elig+yob
Experience2
Earnings loss due to lost 
experience
Earnings loss due to lost 
experience
Notes: The table reports estimates of the human capital earnings function described in the text.  The schooling and experience terms are endogenous.  The 
reported F-statistic is for the years of schooling first stage, adjusted for other endogenous variables.  
Table 7: Years-of-college effects for white men born 1948-52
Quadratic experience effect Linear experience effect
OLS OLS2SLS 2SLS LIML 2SLS 2SLS LIML
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
 A.  No disability adjustment
Years of college .130 .076 .089 .085 .132 .077 .085 .081
(.0008) (.0446) (.044) (.047) (.0008) (.0448) (.044) (.047)
Years of secondary .101 .152 .1441 .1470 .082 .149 .1426 .1461
(.0020) (.0351) (.035) (.037) (.0017) (.0355) (.035) (.037)
Years of primary .092 .060 .068 .067 .049 .055 .056 .055
(.0041) (.0131) (.016) (.016) (.0035) (.0056) (.005) (.006)
Experience -.120 -.008 -.0245 -.0239 -.008 .008 .0074 .0076
(.0062) (.0314) (.041) (.041) (.0005) (.0021) (.002) (.002)
.0020 .0003 .0006 .0005
(.0001) (.0005) (.0007) (.0007)
Experience derivative -.0053 .0079 .0074 .0076
(.0005) (.0043) (.0021) (.0046)
.014 -.015 -.014 -.014 .015 -.016 -.015 -.015
(.0011) (.0021) (.0043) (.0022) (.0011) (.0043) (.0042) (.0045)
B. With disability adjustment
Years of college 0.129 0.084 0.097 0.094 0.130 0.086 0.092 0.088
-(.0008) -(.0443) -(.0437) -(.0465) (.0008) (.0446) (.0436) (.0469)
.013 -.016 -.014 -.015 .015 -.016 -.015 -.016
(.0011) (.0043) (.0043) (.0022) (.0011) (.0042) (.0042) (.0045)
First-stage F-statistic for education 29.69 18.08 44.35 18.08
(adjusted multivariate)
Elig+age Elig+yob Elig+age Elig+yob
Experience2
Earnings loss due to lost 
experience
Earnings loss due to lost 
experience
Notes: The table reports estimates of the human capital earnings function described in the text.  The years of college and experience terms are endogenous.  Other 
schooling variables are exogenous controls.  The reported F-statistic is for the years of college first stage, adjusted for other endogenous variables.
Table A1: Descriptive statistics for white cohorts
1950-52 1948-52 1948-53 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953
A. Demographics and veteran status
Draft eligibility (by RSN) .376 .437 .405 .530 .536 .538 .339 .260 .259
Veteran status (served in Vietnam Era) .236 .305 .276 .446 .384 .300 .221 .193 .139
Post-Vietnam service .038 .034 .037 .027 .030 .033 .037 .044 .050
Group quarters .016 .015 .015 .014 .014 .015 .016 .016 .017
Now in military .0027 .0024 .0026 .0019 .0022 .0024 .0026 .0030 .0032
Now in school .028 .026 .027 .023 .024 .026 .028 .030 .031
Age 48.2 49.2 48.7 51.3 50.2 49.2 48.2 47.2 46.2
B. Labor market variables
Employment .861 .855 .857 .843 .850 .855 .861 .865 .867
Unemployment .027 .027 .027 .026 .027 .027 .027 .027 .028
Not in labor force .112 .118 .116 .131 .124 .118 .112 .107 .105
Usual hours worked 41.5 41.2 41.3 40.5 40.9 41.2 41.5 41.7 41.8
Weeks worked 44.8 44.5 44.6 43.9 44.2 44.4 44.8 45.0 45.1
Wage and salary income 46406 46595 46521 46830 46957 46293 46592 46331 46176
C. Education variables
Imputed highest grade completed 13.8 13.8 13.8 13.9 13.9 13.8 13.8 13.7 13.77th or 8t  grade + .990 .990 .990 .98 .990 .989 .991 .990 .991
Years of college 1.76 1.79 1.76 1.84 1.82 1.80 1.76 1.72 1.66
9th grade + .977 .975 .976 .971 .974 .975 .978 .978 .979
10th grade + .965 .963 .963 .958 .961 .963 .966 .966 .966
11th grade + .948 .946 .946 .942 .943 .945 .948 .949 .948
12th grade (no diploma) + .931 .930 .930 .927 .928 .930 .932 .932 .930
High school graduate + .910 .908 .908 .906 .907 .908 .910 .910 .907
Some college (less than 1 year) + .655 .659 .654 .667 .667 .662 .657 .646 .629
1 or more years of college (no degree) + .582 .588 .582 .599 .598 .591 .584 .571 .551
.411 .419 .413 .433 .428 .420 .411 .402 .387
Bachelor's degree + .333 .341 .335 .358 .350 .342 .333 .324 .309
Master's degree + .135 .140 .137 .151 .145 .139 .135 .131 .122
Professional degree + .051 .052 .051 .054 .053 .051 .051 .050 .047
D. Disability variables
Non-work disabilities .070 .074 .072 .082 .077 .074 .070 .068 .065
Any disabilities .193 .198 .196 .211 .202 .199 .192 .189 .184
N (log earnings) 573728 934666 1134983 178349 182315 183435 191559 198734 200267
N (all other variables) 696530 1141905 1382708 220891 224130 223984 232348 240198 240736
Note: All estimates and statistics use census weights.
Associate's degree +
Table A2: Descriptive statistics for nonwhite cohorts
1950-52 1948-52 1948-53 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953
A. Demographics and veteran status
Draft eligibility (by RSN) .382 .440 .408 .538 .537 .544 .343 .265 .265
Veteran status (served in Vietnam Era) .293 .293 .274 .404 .353 .285 .231 .216 .183
Post-Vietnam service .058 .058 .066 .039 .042 .050 .071 .083 .101
Group quarters .064 .064 .066 .056 .060 .064 .066 .071 .076
Now in military .0025 .0025 .0028 .0020 .0019 .0020 .0027 .0038 .0039
Now in school .043 .043 .044 .038 .039 .045 .044 .048 .050
Age 49.2 49.2 48.6 51.3 50.2 49.3 48.2 47.3 46.2
B. Education variables
Employment .665 .662 .663 .657 .654 .662 .666 .669 .670
Unemployment .056 .054 .055 .047 .055 .053 .056 .057 .059
Not in labor force .279 .284 .282 .296 .291 .285 .279 .274 .270
Usual hours worked 32.8 32.6 32.7 32.1 32.3 32.6 32.8 33.1 33.0
Weeks worked 35.9 35.7 35.7 35.4 35.4 35.7 35.8 36.1 35.9
Wage and salary income 27584 27711 27561 28395 27490 27569 27508 27670 26874
C. Education variables
Imputed highest grade completed 12.6 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.6 12.6 12.5 12.67th or 8t  grade + .973 .971 .972 .967 .967 .971 .973 .97 .977
Years of college 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.08 1.05 1.06 1.05 1.03 1.02
9th grade + .948 .944 .946 .936 .936 .946 .948 .951 .953
10th grade + .923 .918 .920 .908 .908 .920 .923 .927 .930
11th grade + .882 .876 .878 .865 .866 .880 .882 .884 .887
12th grade (no diploma) + .832 .826 .828 .818 .817 .829 .831 .835 .833
High school graduate + .770 .766 .767 .759 .758 .768 .771 .772 .770
Some college (less than 1 year) + .468 .468 .467 .470 .464 .466 .472 .466 .461
1 or more years of college (no degree) + .400 .400 .399 .406 .398 .399 .404 .397 .392
.226 .228 .227 .235 .229 .231 .226 .221 .221
Bachelor's degree + .160 .163 .162 .170 .164 .165 .162 .154 .156
Master's degree + .057 .060 .058 .068 .062 .061 .059 .051 .052
Professional degree + .018 .019 .019 .021 .019 .020 .019 .017 .017
D. Disability variables
Non-work disabilities .116 .120 .118 .130 .125 .119 .115 .114 .110
Any disabilities .326 .332 .329 .343 .342 .331 .325 .321 .314
N (log earnings) 71045 113194 137938 20286 21863 23383 23004 24658 24744
N (all other variables) 96217 154810 188023 28272 30321 31942 31162 33113 33213





(1) (2) (3) (4)
1948 195/366 -0.0015 -0.0025 0.0048
[.533] (.0011) (.0012) (.0022)
1949 195/365 0.0018 0.0017 0.0028
[.534] (.0011) (.0012) (.0033)
1950 195/365 0.0049 0.0041 0.0097
[.534] (.0011) (.0012) (.0032)
1951 125/365 -0.0025 -0.0030 0.0002
[.342] (.0011) (.0011) (.0031)
1952 95/366 0.0008 0.00003 0.0055
[.260] (.0010) (.0010) (.0028)
1953 95/365 -0.0002 -0.0011 0.0050
[.260] (.0010) (.0010) (.0028)
5.07 4.37 3.24
N 1570310 1382287 188023





Notes: The theoretical proportion draft eligible is reported in 
column 1 for each cohort.  Fractions appear in brackets.   Columns 
2-4 report the difference between this and the empirical proportion 
draft-eligible, with robust standard errors in parentheses. The F-
statistic is for a joint test of theoretical and empirical equality for all 
 cohorts.
Table A4: Earnings functions with additional experience terms
Log weekly wages, no disability adjustment, Whites born 1948-52
Linear experience Quadratic experience Cubic experience Quartic experience
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Education 0.1172 0.0685 0.1178 0.0681 0.1189 0.0691 0.1185 0.0692
(0.0007) (0.0338) (0.0007) (0.0338) (0.0007) (0.0350) (0.0007) (0.0384)
Scaled potential Exp. 0.1163 0.0855 0.2518 0.1104 0.1980 0.0937 0.2617 0.0900
(0.0071) (0.0232) (0.0119) (0.0691) (0.0110) (0.2085) (0.0158) (0.6323)
0.1849 0.0317 0.3663 -0.0376 0.4831 -0.0265
(0.0129) (0.0838) (0.0219) (0.8308) (0.0262) (1.7683)
0.3197 -0.0625 0.1941 -0.0156
(0.0228) (0.7453) (0.0384) (7.0113)
-0.2254 0.0357
(0.0447) (5.3823)
Returns to experience 0.0093 0.0068 0.0090 0.0069 0.0090 0.0068 0.0090 0.0068




Notes: The table reports variations on the specifications reported in Table 6, with additional polynomial experience controls.  The instrument sets include an 
indicator for draft eligibility and polynomial terms in age corresponding to the experience terms  in the model.  The age and experience terms in all models 
were rescaled to lie in the interval [-1,1].
